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INTRODUCTION 
l. Aim and Method o:f The.sis 
The purpose o:f this paper is to make clear the pri-
mary contributions o:f dOnathan Edwards to thought about the 
problem of freedom and determinism. This goal will be pur-
sued by an analysis o:f the early influences that were vital 
to the shaping of his thought and by an interpretation o:f his 
own doctrines. It is realized that an exhaustive analysis o:f 
Edwards's philosophy and theology would be impossible in the; 
limited bounds o:f this discussion and this :fact has neces-
sitated a smaller area of concentration. However, it should 
be pointed out that Edwards's view on freedom and determin-
ism colored all his philosophical ideas and that it is neces-
sary to understand clearly ·what he meant by these terms i:f 
one is to judge the man and his thought fairly. 
Contrary to what some have thought, Edwards's chief aim 
was not to :formulate a theory of the will but rather to glori-
:fy God and his sovereignty over man. At the same time, how-
ever, Edwards asserted human responsibility and sought to re-
concile it with the eternal decrees of God. The task o:f hold-
ing fast to both divine sovereignty and the need o:f human e:f-
:fort was o:f course a delicate matter, but Edwards was 
- - I------·-----·----··-·----·---~-·-·---·- - ~~-- I"·- -------
American Men of Letters Seriesn for the year 1949, it is a 
careful analysis of Edwards's primary doctrines and points out 
any contemporary significance that they may have. A Ph.D. dis.-
sertation The Philosophy o:f donathan Edwards and Its Relation 
to his Theology, written at Boston University in 1904 by Cle-
ment Holmes, has also been a source :for valuable material. 
In addition to the references already cited, use is made 
o:f many other books and article's which have contributed. essen-
tial information. 
2. The Problem Stated 
The problem of :freedom and determinism is not new. Phi-
losophers and theologians o:f all ages have struggled with the 
question as to whether a man's ultimate destiny was his own 
responsibility or the responsibility of some uncontrollable 
:fate. The very constitution o:f man's personality demanded re-
flective thought concerning such problems as immortality, 
death, future punishment, and sal vat ion. In fact, every re-
ligious and philosophical system has :found it necessary to 
take· some definite position on the question. Either they have 
ignored the question completely or have stated in clear terms 
that the responsibility o:f destiny rests with man or that it 
rests with God. In no instance, however, has any coherent sys-
tem o:f thought been able to escape the necessity of positing 
some answer. 
Elements of the· controversy are found in Oriental phi-
losophy where the Br:ahmins, Buddha, and Mahomet supposedly 
3 
all taught a strict determinm5~, whereas Confucius and Zore-
aster emphasized freedom. In the Koran the following passage 
is noted which will se.rve to illustrate the point of view of 
Mahomet. 
And there are others who wait with suspense the decree of 
God; whether he will punmsh them, or vh ether he will be 
turned unto them.l 
Probably the oldest reference that bears on this discus-
sion is to be found in one of the maxims or the ancient Egyp-
tian sage, Ptah-hotep, dating from about 3580 B.C. 
None may know adversity, when it cometh, nor when it 
shall relieve him, for the will or rate is hid from all.2 
Among the early Greeks there was emphasis on both freedom 
and determinsim. The concept of the fate or the gods was the 
usual form or Greek determinism although a strictly atomistic 
determinism is round in the philosophy or Leuaippus and Demo-
critus. Epicurus, on the other hand, found a place for indeter::::· 
minism in his concept of the "cosmic swerve. 11 3 As Epicurus con 
ceived the action of the universe, a purely deterministic sys-;. 
tem would deny the possibility or interaction unless from the 
beginning there was inherent in the very nature or the atoms 
themselves some element or indeterminism. This concept became 
the basis for his belief in freedom. 
Socrates, according to the estimate of some, has been 
called an intellectual determinist, holding that action is 
1. Koran, 2, 21. 
2. Horne, FWHR, 16. 
3. Lucretius(in Oates), De: Rerum Natura, line 219. 
4 
is determined by ideas, good action by knowledge and bad ac-
tion by ignorance. 
Virgil's Aeneid is clear in pointing out that the will o:f 
the gods once announced, fato profugus,4 becomes the fate o:f 
men. 
The early church theologians ~ustin Martyr, St. Augus-
tine, and St.·~erome believed firmly in determinism. Equally 
dogmatic in their assertions against determinism were other 
early church theologians such as Irenaeus, Clement of Alex-
andria, Origen, Tertullian, Chrysostom and Pelagius. The 
followers of St. Thomas Aquinas were determinists whereas 
the followers of Duns Scotus were freedomists. It should be 
noted, however, that ~esuits today are freedomists rather 
than determinists. 
The Reformation o:f the: sixteenth century, spearheaded by 
Luther, Calvin,·and Zwingli was noted for its particular em-
phasis on the sovereignty of God.' s will. On the other hand, 
~ames Arminius:, a Duthh theologian of the early seventeenth 
century, strongly oppos.ed the; Re:formation doctrines by assert-
ing the universality of the atonement and the possibility of 
resisting God's divine grace~ Following in the footsteps o:f 
~ames Arminius,, ~ohn Wesley, the founder o:f Methodism, con-
tinued to proclaim Arminius' s views but added particular em-
phasis to the doctrine of Christian perfection. 
Among more modern thinkers who have made attempts to 
4. Virgil, Aeneid., line 2. 
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analyze the problem of freedom we should mention such men as: 
Desca:btes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Locke, 
Berkeley, Lotze, James, Taylor, 1/!Ihedon, and Bowne. However, it 
is unnecessary for the purposes of this paper to attempt a 
complete listing of all who have made contributid>ns to the 
concept of freedom and determinism. Evidence of its consider-
ation in the history of philosophy does not need further veri-
fication. 
3. Edwards as Philosopher and Theologian 
Henry Bamford Parkes in an estimate of Jonathan Edwards: 
makes the statement nthe career of Jonathan Edwards in its 
hidden implications is the most tragic in American hiatory.u5 
The reason for such an assertion is to be found in a close 
analysis of the times in which Edwards lived and in a compre-
hensive view of his own genius:. Although there were certainly 
many other Calvinistic theologians at the time of Edwards, yet 
Edwards's thought seemed to transcend his immediate contem-
poraries and this fact in itself became the chief cause of 
misunderstanding in the minds of those who sought to interpret 
his system. 
Furthermore, there was a wide discrepancy between Ed-
wards's Christian experience and his theology. The essence of 
his experience consisted in a harmonious adjustment of his own 
soul with the goodness and excellency of God whereas his 
5. Parkes, JE, 254. 
6 
theology was largely the product of external forces and cir-
cumstances. Failure to be aware of this dfuscrepancy in Ed-
wards's thought has caused widespread misunderstanding of the 
real man Edwards. He has commonly been given the brand name: 
neal vinist" with no further qualification and, at best, this 
is an unfair criterion of evaluation-
N'bting this same contrast in the thought of Edwards, 
Frederick Mayer in A His~ury of American Thought states: 
In his philosophy he combined rationalism wi~h mysti-
cism. On the one hand, he was a theologian who gave a 
systematic outline of Christian doctrines:; on the! other 
hand, he was a sim ere bgliever who tried to find a 
personal union with God. 
Outstanding in its influence: upon the early thought of 
Edwards was the thought of Locke, and J"ohnson. Under the di--
rection of J"ohnson at Yale, Edwards was introduced to Locke's 
Essay Concerning the Human Understanding and the effect of 
this study is refllected in Edwards's. later work The Freedom 
of the Will. 
The marked similarity between the metaphysics of Ed-
wards amt that of Berkeley sh. auld be noted. This fact is all 
the more unusual since there is no historical evidence to 
prove that Edwards was familiar with Berkeley's thought. The 
position of both men can best be described as a spiritualistic 
metaphysics,. The world is conceived to be an ideal order of 
mental reality. Existence' is., then, mental in nature. 
In The Development of Ame::r.ican Philosophy by Muelder and 
6. Mayer, HAT, 39. 
7 
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Sears, the thought of Newton is mentioned? as another signif-
icant influence upon Edwards. 
In early New England theology, Edwards belonged in the 
transitional period between what Haroutunian calls "theocen-
tric piety andl humanitarian morality.n8 Calvinism had come to 
New England in the seventeanth century with all its narrow 
standards and rigid demands, but there soon arose a marked 
contrast between the Calvinistic doctrines and the kind of 
life that its so-called adherents ld:Jvedl. Calvinism began to 
lose its original inspiration and force and slowly degener-
ated into a religion having a form but no content. 
It must not be overlooked, however, that Calvinism sup-
plied the people in early New England with a church and com-
forted them in their sufferings under persecution, but Calvin-
ism as a religion was not suited to the general spirit of the 
times. Men were no longer dependent serfs subject to a lord. 
Rather, they were free for the first time in their lives, and 
the transition from slavery to liberty was accompanied by a 
simultaneous change in attidlude toward religion. Mem were free 
to build their own homes, to build their own places of busi-
ness, to take part in profitable-exchange, and they began to 
demand the protection of their rights as land owners and the 
privilege to keep their rightful earnings .• 
The· q_uality of mind which grew out· of such a social 
pattern had for its dominant traits the principles of 
7. Muelder andl Se:ars, DAP, 2. 
8. Haroutunian, PVM, xxiv(in Preface). 
the freedom or individuals, their right to happiness, 
their right to seek their own ends, for their own suc-
cess and prosperity, in so far as they did not impede.· 
others from being similarly occupied. The greatest hap-
piness :5f the greatest number became a basic principle 
or social and economic theory, and the autonomy and in-
trinsic value of individuals, the foundation of social justice and public law.9 
Thus properly to evaluate and interpret the thought or 
J"onathan Edwards, we· must keep in the back or ou:D minds the 
spirit or the.times in which he lived. Much of his thought, 
both in his philosophy and in his theology, was a direct re-
action against the n carefree11 attitude which dominated the 
minds of the people. He was primarily concerned with ntheo-
centric pietyn rather than "humanitarian morali tytt and in 
holding to this position he became the subject of considerable 
criticism and unjust judgment •. 
This reaction against Edwards reached its peak during 
the Great Awakening, particularly between 1730 and 1740. The 
chief opponent was Charles Chauncy, who·· opposed th-g work or 
Edwards. upon the ground or its emotional excesses. Others 
joined with Chauncy in his opposition to Edwards and in callin 
. 
in q_uestion the basic tenets or Calvinism. Among this group 
the most outstanding were Lemuel Briant (1722-1754), and J"ona-
than Mayhew (1720-1766). Under the leadership of William 
Ellery Channing, this movement finally culminated in the Uni-
tarian schism of the Congregational churches, and the organi-
:z;ation of the American Unitarian Ass:ociation. 
9. Haroutunian, PVM, xvi(in Preface). 
9 
The judging or Edwards was unjust, at least in most in-
stances, because his accusers had not taken time to analyze: 
and evaluate what his real motive was in seeking to defend 
the,ocentric :piety. Edwards maintained that humanitarian moral-
i ty was im:possi bl e without a :prior theocentric :piety. But this 
insistence upon a :personal relationship with God made Edwards 
no less concerned with the welfare an~ good or society as a 
whole. Actually, the deepest burden or his heart was ror the 
good or society but ror the realization or that good Edwards 
considered a :per~onal God-consciousness as a necessary :pre-
requisite. His critics had misjudged his basic motive. 
However, Edwards's accusers did have some rational ground~ 
ror their accusations even though it is sare to say that they 
• 
misjudged him. Edwards went to such an extreme in his emphasis 
upon :personal :piety that there seemed almost a complete divorcE 
between his concern ror :piety and his concern ror social moral-
ity. Actually there was a vital connection but some students 
or Edwards fail to grant this. Thus, for example, Haroutunian 
says: 
For him religion was independent or the :problems or 
social morality and uivil government •. He ignored the· 
social :principles in the Calvinistic idea or theocracy, 
and made Calvinistic :piety a matter which concerned :pri-
marily the relation or the individual soul to God. Ed-
wards :put the theology or Calvinism upon the basis or an 
empirical :piety, and defended its doctrines :philosoph-
ically and rationally. He interpreted Calvinism as a 
religious :philosophy or nature, and. reasserted its doc-
trines in view or the racts or life as well as on scrip-
tural foundations. Calvinistic theology was thus separated 
rrom its temporary social and :political aspects, and 
lO 
restated as a religion of' permanent human signif'icance.lO 
Even though the problem raised here is not the primary 
consideration of' this thesis, yet it is a problem which has 
important significance in Edwards's theology and philosophy. 
In ref'erence to the f'oregoing quotation and particularly to 
the f'irst sentence "For him religion was independent of' the 
problems of' social morality and civil government,H Edwards 
himself' would be the f'irst to disagree with such a statem"6lill.t. 
There is ample evidence in the personal writings of' Edwards 
... ~ :. 
to lead to the conclusion that f'ar f'rom,shutting his eyes to 
the problems of' social morality, Edwards considened the pro-
blems as having supreme significance and he expressed this 
view persistently. 
In thinking of' Edwards f'rom a dif'f'erent point of' view, 
we f'ind that he was no less a philosopher than a theologian. 
When only twelve years old he began to show unusual talent 
in writing and it is recorded that at this early age he wrote 
a lengthy criticism of' the notion that the soul is material. 
This article gave evidence of' rare philosophical insight and 
was the f'.irst of' many such articles. 
At f'ourteen he was reading Locke with more pleasure "than 
the most greedy miser f'inds, when gathering up handf'uls of' 
silver and gold, f'rom some newly discovered treasure.nll Ed-
~ wardsts keen intellect, combined with an insatiable curiosity 
10. Haroutunian, PVM, xxi(in Pref'ace). 
11. Quoted f'rom Townsend, PIUS, 36. 
ll 
for the "whyn of things, produced in his; mind the ideal con-
ditions for philosophical speculations. Thus it is no wonder 
that even when a mere child he found himself in anguis:h over 
the fact of existence. 11What need was there that any thing 
should be?n was a question that plagued his mind constantly .. 
This attitude of mind was characteristic of Edwards ancl re-
mained with him all through his life. 
It is interesting to note at this point the similarity 
between Edwards's problem concerning existence and the pro-
blem of Heidegger.l2 According to Heidegger, the concept of 
nbeing" is the most universal one and consequently the one 
demanding the most philesophical consideration. 
Edwards published a score of sermons and two longer trea-
tises during his stay at Northampton, Massachusetts. The two 
longer treatises were Some Thoughts Concerning the Present 
Revival of Religion in New England (1742), and A Treatise 
Concerning Religious Affections (1746). White at Stockbridge, 
Massachusetts, where he served as a ~issionary to the Indians 
for seven years., he published A Careful and Strict Inquiry 
into the Modern Prevailing Notions of that Freedom of the Will 
which is supposed to be Essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and 
Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and. Blame (1754), and The 
Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin Defended (1758). The 
~alance of his work was published after his death and the 
most significant of these publications were A Dissertation 
12. See Heidegger, EAB, 26. 
12 
Concerning the Nature of True Virtue, and A Dissertation Con-
cerning the End for whill&h God Created the World. 
Besides what has been listed as his outstanding works, 
there are almost innumerable minor sermons, .controversial 
writings, and a considerable mass of ~npublished manuscripts 
on various subjects--both theological and philosophical. 
Thus it is not strange that some have given to Edwards 
the honor of being the first an& perhaps greatest philosoph-
ical thinker in America. In the Encyclopedia of Religion, 
edited by Vergilius Ferm, €!-ncarticle written by Luther A. 
Weigle has this to say about Edwards: 
Edwards had one of the most powerful minds that America 
has brought forth, and remains its greatest theologian. 
His theology has philosophical grounding, depth, and 
poise; and his treatise on The Freedom of the· Will has 
been said to be ttthe one large contribution which America 
has mad~ to the deeper philosophical thought of the 
world.l 
Edwards's career was that of an undaunted seeker for truth 
who would go to any length to gain a more coherent view of his 
own existence, purpose, and destiny. 
His greatness lies first, in his independent and original 
mind; second, in the systematic character of his work; 
and third, in the singleness of purpose by which he left 
a profound and lasting impression on the growing culture 
of the, young nation. Clergyman though he was, he was above· 
and beyond all a metaphysician.l4 
l}. Weigle, Art.(l945). 
14. Townsend, PIUS, 38. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
EARLY INFLUENCES 
1. Family 6onnections 
If noble ancestry is an aid to greatness then J"onathan 
Edwards was unusually endowed. The two families from which 
he descended are those of Edwards and Stoddard. The Edwards 
family was of Welsh origin whereas the Stoddard family was 
English. The Rev. Richard Edwards, great-great-grandfather, 
and earliest known ancestor of President Edwards, was a clergy 
man in London in the time of Q,ue:en Elizabeth. His son, William 
Edwards, came to Hartford, Connecticut, in the year 1640 and 
was a wealthy and outstanding merchant. Richard Edwards, the 
grandfather of J"onathan, was born in Hartford in 1647 and also 
became a wealthy merchant. His eldest son, Timothy, who later 
became the father of J"onathan, became a well educated minister 
At the age of twenty-two he had received the Master of Arts 
degree from Harvard College and upon graduation had entered 
the ministry, taking charge of a pastorate in Windsor, Con-
necticut. 
From the Stoddard side of the family, J"onathan Edwards's, 
inheritance was no less outstanding. His grandfather, Rev. 
Solomon Stoddard, received the Bachelor of Arts degree from 
14 
Harvard College in 1662 and seven years later, he became the 
minister at Northampton, Massachusetts. He preached in this: 
town for the rest of his life, a period of sixty years. 
He was a man celebrated throughout the colonies for his 
capacity, his knowledge of men, his influence in the 
churches, and his zeal for vital religion.l 
Timothy Edwards, son of Richard Edwards, married Esther 
Stoddard, the second child of the Rev. Solomon Stoddard. This 
marriage brought together these two outstanding families and 
the children of this union showed all the marks of their im-
mediate forefathers. 
Jonathan Edwards, about whom we are chiefly concerned, 
was the fifth child of Timothy and Esther Edwards. He was 
born in Windsor, Connecticut, on October 5, 1703. The atmos-
phere of the Edwards home reflected a e~~eful combination of 
discipline and affection, and Jonathan very early in1life 
learned the meaning of obedience and refinement. He was 
taught to pray, to feel humble before God, and to have a deep 
sense of responsibility for the well-being of his own soul. 
At the age of six Edwards began the study of Latin under 
the teaching of his father and older sisters. All his pre-
collegiate work was taken in his own home, since the most 
qualified scholars in Windsor, Connecticut, were those in his 
own family. The discipline imposed upon him in those early 
years is evidenced by the fact that upon entering college, Ed-
wards possessed a thorough knowledge of Latin, Greek, and!. 
1. Dwight, LOE, ll. 
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Hebrew. 
One policy in the Edwards family which produced worthy 
results was that of encouraging the children to write, not 
only in the form of letters but also in the form of composi-
tions on various topics. This accounts for the early produc-
tions from the pen of Edwards which show a remarkable grasp 
of the English language, both in form and in vocabulary. 
Edwards's early years were also characterized by a con-
stant search for inward peace of mind and what he termed holi-
ness. He was never satisfied that he was as good as he could 
be and thus the main drive of his soul was always to become 
more holy before God. 
The first instance that I remember of that sort of in-
ward, sweet delight in God and divine things that I have 
lived much in since, was on reading those words, I Tim. 
1:17, Now unto the King eternal, immortal, invisible, the 
only wise God, be honor and glory forever and ever, Amen. 
As; I read the words, there came into my soul, and was as. 
it were diffused through it,. a sense of the glory of the 
Divine Being; a new sense, quite different-from anything 
I ever experienced before ••• From about that time, I be-
gan to have a new kind of apprehensions and ideas of 
Christ, and the work of redemption, and the glorious way 
of salvation by him. An inward, sweet sense of these 
things, at times., came into my heart; and my soul was 
led away in pleasant views. and contemplations of them ..• 
The sense I had of divine things, would often of a sudden 
kindle up, as it were, a sweet burning in my heart; an 
ardor of soul, that I know not how to express.2 
However, Edwards kept seeking for still further knowledge 
of God. His passionate desire for the best and highest that 
2. Edwards, WPE, I, 19. All references in this thesis to Ed-
wards, v'VPE, refer to the reprint of the Worcester edition, in 
4 vols. References: to a second edition of Edwards's works: 
will be designated Edwards, WPE(Dwight). 
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God could perform in his own heart was to him the most impor-
tant phase of his life. Edwards says: 
I felt then great satisfaction, as to my good state; but 
that did not content me. I had vehement longings of soul 
after God and Christ, and after more holiness, wherewith 
my heart seemed to be full, and ready to break; ••• My 
longings after God and holiness were much increased •.. I 
felt a burning desire to be in every thing a complete 
Christian; and conformed to the blessed image of Christ; 
and that I might live, in all things, according to the 
pure, sweet and blessed rules of the gospel .•• Holiness, 
as I then wrote down some of my contemplations on it, 
appeared to me to be of a -sweet, pleasant, charming, se-
rene, calm nature; which brought an inexpressible purity, 
brightness, peacefulness and ravishment to the soul.3 
Thus in view of the wholesome and scholarly background 
whillch Edwards was favored with, coupled with his own bril-
liance and constant search for truth, it is not strange that 
he was marked for greatness. His greatness, however, was not 
limited to greatness of ability and intellect, but reached 
also within his soul. 
2. College Days at Yale 
donathan Edwards entered Yale College in New Haven, Con-
necticut, in Septem~er, 1716, before he was thirteen years of 
age. Upon entrance into college he already possessed a thor-
ough knowledge of Greek, Latin, and Hebrew. As a student, Ed-
wards was distinguished for his aptitude and diligent appli-
cation to his studies. But most remarkable in the course of 
his college education were the productions of his pen which 
displayed keenness of mind rarely seen in so young a student. 
3. Edwards, WPE, I, 21. 
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The two most outstanding manuscripts, written between the ages 
of' fourteen and seventeen, were Notes: on the Mind and Notes 
on Natural Science. 
The series of' remarks, entitled 11 The Mindff judging both 
f'rom the handwriting and the subjects, I suppose was com-
menced either during, or soon af'ter his perusal of' Locke's 
Essay on the Human Understanding.4 
In order to gain some understanding of' the content of' the 
Notes on the Mind, a :Lew of' the topics discussed are listed. 
PLACE OF MINDS •• 9No doubt that all Finite Spirits, united 
to bodies or not, are thus in place; that is, that they 
perceive, or passively receive, ideas, only of' created 
things, that are in some particular place at a given 
time.5 
PERCEPTION of' separate minds. Our perceptions, or ideas 
that .. we passiV.ely receive by our bodies, are communicated 
to us immediately by God, while our minds are united with 
our bodies .• b 
UNION of' mind with body. The Mind is so united with the 
Body, that an alteration is caused in the Body, it is 
probable, by every action of' the Mind.7 
CERTAINTY~ Determined that there are many degrees of' 
certainty, though not indeed of' absolute certainty ••• We 
are certain of' many things upon demonstration, which ~et 
we may be made more certain of' by more demonstration. 
EXISTENCE ••• But we know, that the things that are objects. 
of' this sense, all that the mind views by Seeing, are 
merely mental Existences~9 
CONSCIOUSNESS is the mind's perceiving what is in itself'--
ideas, actiof8' passions:, and every thing that is there 
perceptible. 
4. Dwight, LOE, 34. 
5. Edwards, Notes. on the Mind, in Dwight, LOE, 678. 
6. Ibid. , 679. 
7. Ibid., 679. 
8. Ibid., 689. 
9. Ibid., 668. 
10. Ibid., 680. 
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TRUTH. After all that has been said and done, the only 
adequate definition of' Truth is, The agreement of' our 
ideas with existence.ll 
These abstracts only represent a f'ew of' the topics which 
Edwards dealt with in his discourse. However, they are suf'-
f'icient to illustrate the way in which Edwards thought and 
the clear way in which he expressed himself'. 
In Edwards's Notes on Natural Science he displays also a 
rare understanding of' natural phenomenon and gives answers 
which in many instances are verified by present-day science. 
The Scientific Monthly for May, 1949,12 has called Edwards 
the ttpascal of' American in that he was .America's first physica 
scientist. It is further pointed out that the methods used by 
Edwards in arriving at his conclusions were sound and subject 
to scientific demonstration, although it should be noted that 
most of these conclusions were the result of' logical deduction, 
and were not actually demonstrated until later. Edwards's 
scientific considerations included: the stars, the sun, the 
notion that the· universe is a spheroid, that the precession 
of' the equinoxes was the effect of' the earth's poles,l3 why 
winter is colder than summer, explanations of the sun's rays, 
thunder, lightning, and innumerable· other millnor notes and ob-
servations. 
11. Edwards, Notes on the Mind, in Dwight, LOE, 687. 
12. Suter, Art.(l949)~ 
13. Edwards placed the period of' this gyration at 25,200 years 
whereas modern texts place it at 25,800 years. Thus Edwards 
came within 600 years of the most accurate figure that scien-
tists of today can give. 
l 
·-
Suter says.: 
Edwards is most exciting, however, as a theoretical 
physicist. His discussion or the atom is a rascinating 
bit or scientific curiosa.l4 
The conventional picture of the atom as the particle 
having the quality of least reducibility he rejects and sub-
stitutes in its stead an entity having the quality of what he 
calls indis cerpti bili ty--a purely mechanical attribute. 
Edwards goes into detail in the analysis of indiscerpti-
bility. An indiscerptible body is a plenum. That is, it 
is absolutely full and perfectly solid. This does not 
mean, however, that an atom may not be honeycombed with 
pores--or even that there may not be more empty than 
filled space in it.A."thing is plenum when every part with 
in it is in 11 contact by surfacen with some other part, 
all of which parts may run up and downways and criss-
cross between the pores.l5 
Both in his strUQmes of mind and of natural science, Ed-
wards has shown amazing philosophical and scientific insight, 
and in particular reference to his atomic theory, he was far 
in advance of his contemporaries. Furthermore, it must not be 
forgotten that Edwards was still in college when he wrote 
these outstanding notes. 
Edwards graduated from Yale College in 1720, before he 
was seventeen years of' age. The only exercise at his commence-
ment was a valedictory oration, written in Latin, and the hon-
or of' this exercise was awarded to Edwards ror having attained 
the highest rank as a scholar among the members of the gradu-
ating class. It is disappointing that the subject or this: 
14. Suter, Art. (1949). 
15. Ibid. 
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valedictory speech does not seem to be recorded among any or 
Edwards's later writings. 
3 . .John Galvin 
Besides the, important influence, or ramily connections 
and college days at Yale, a third inrluence that made an in-
delible stamp upon the early lire or Edwards was Calvinistic 
theology. At the time or graduation from college he had not 
committed himself to either the Calvinistic or the Arminian 
point of view. Samuel .Johnson, one or his proressors at Yale, 
was Arminian in his theology and exerted a strong, inrluence 
on Edwards's thinking. On the other hand, Edwards's home back-
ground was Calvinistic and this was a tie hard to sever, eMen 
in the race of the reasonableness of the Arminian point or 
view held by .Johnson. 
The five years immediately following graduation rrom Yale 
were spent in private study at home, continuing at Yale as a 
tutor, and serving as pastor of a Presbyterian church in New 
York Oity. All during this time, however, Edwards was still 
uncertain as to his honest theological persuasion, and he re-
mained in a sort of neutral attitude toward both Calvinism 
and Arminianism--the two theological positions whillch up until 
that time had exerted the greatest influence upon him. 
However, Edwards began to be convinced that the Calvin-
istic answer was after all the only reasonable one and he em-
braced w~oleheartedly the doctrines or .John Galvin. 
A relativistic theology, such as Arminianism, with its 
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curtailment of the divine omnipotence in favor of human 
initiative and responsibility could hardly prove attrac-
tive to a mind like Edwards's. One to whom God was all 
in all could be satisfied with nothing less than an ab-
solutistic theology such as Calvinism.l6 
His own testimony shows clearly the time when he accepted 
the basic tenet of Calvinism--the absolute sovereignty of God. 
From my childhood up, my mind had been full of objections 
against the doctrine of God's sovereignty, in choosing 
whom he would to eternal life, and re:lrecting W:l om he 
pleased; leaving them eternally to perish, and be ever-
lastingly tormented in hell. It used to appear like a 
horrible doctrine to me. But I remember the time very 
well, when I seemed to be convinced, and fully satisfied, 
as to this sovereignty of God, and his justice in thus 
eternally disposing of men, according to his sovereign 
pleasure. But never could give an account how, or by 
what means, I was thus convinced, not in the least im-
agining at the time, nor a long time after, that there 
was any extraordinary influence of God's Spirit in it; 
but only that now I saw further, and my reason appre-
hended the ij.ustice and reasonableness of it. However, my 
mind rested in it; and it put an end to all those cavils 
and objections. And there has been a wonderful alter-
ation in my mind, with respect to the doctrine of God's 
sovereignty, from that day to this; so that I scarce 
ever have found so much as the rising of an objection 
against it, in the most absolute sense, in God's show-
ing mercy to whom he will show mercy, and hardening whom 
he will. God's a bs.olute sovereignty and justice, vvi th 
respect to salvation and damnation, is what my mind seems 
to rest assured of, as much as of any thing that I see 
with my eyes; at least it is so at times. But I have 
often, since that first conviction, had quite another 
kind of sense of God's sovereignty than I had then. I 
have often since had not only a conviction, but a delight 
ful conviction. The doctrine has very often appeared ex-
ceeding pleasant, bright, and sweet. Absolute sovereignty 
is what I lo~e to ascribe to God. But my first conviction 
was not so .1·1 
One can better understand Edwards's point of view by 
remembering that in his very first writings he thought of God 
in terms of absolute Mind and Being and so it was only a small 
16. McGiffert, JE, 34. 
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jum~ to think or God also as absolute will. (At least it 
seemed that way ror Edwards1.) The decision did not seem to 
cause Edwards any intellectual discomrort nor is there any 
rererence in his later writings that he "B¥.enddoubted ror one 
second the ~ossibility or his choice having been wrong. Having 
once made his choice in ravor or Calvin, Edwards set to work 
immediately to construct a ~olemic against the Arminian point 
or view. 
But Edwards's choice or Calvinism marked a basic change 
in his whole attitude and disposition. Previous to this inci-
dent it seems that he was interested eq_ually in philosophy, 
science, and religion, but arter being convinced or the 
sovereignty or God~ his whole zeal and passion was directed 
to religious studies and the defense or Calvinistic theology. 
True, Edwards continued to be a ~hilosophical theologian and 
all his later manuscripts show a love ror the pure reasonable-
ness or things, but ror the rest or his lire his ~rimary em-
phasis was on religion rather than on philosophy. 
By accepting Calvin's basic thesis, the sovereignty or 
God, the accompanying implications or that thesis were soon 
worked out in the logical and disciplined mind or Edwards, 
and he lost no time in constructing his. own deterministic 
system. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES 
Various. psychological considerations are necessary in 
order to understand the reasoning whereby Edwards arrived at 
his conclusions concerning the will. Edwards was convinced 
that there are two cardinal faculties of the mind.l First, 
the intellectual factor--called reason or understanding; and 
secondly, the active and feeling factor--called will or af-
fections. In terms of function, the intellect precedes the· 
will in that it perceives and knows objects in their q_uali ties 
circumstances, and relations. The second faculty follows the 
intellect, and experiences emotions and passions, or desires 
and choices, in relation to the objects perceived. 
Thus the acts of will, or the affections, are eq_ually as 
necessary as the intellect. When this second factor of the 
mind and its objects are brought together, volition or choice 
takes place, according to the nature and laws of this faculty. 
Several points must be clarified in order to understand 
the underlying psychology which Edwards uses in forming his. 
theory of the will, which arises out of this basic conception. 
1. See Edwards, WPE, III, 3·. 
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l. Affections 
Edwards defined the affections as ttno other than the more 
vigorous and sensible exercises of the inclination and will of 
the soul. n2 Following the perception of an object by the intel-
lect, it is the function of the affections to be either in-
clined or disinclined, in respect to the particular object of. 
perception. Thus; it is that faculty of the mind whm&h responds. 
to a particular stimulus, either as liking or disliking, 
pleased or displeased, t.liat Edwards calls the affections. 
The exercise of this faculty are of two sorts; either 
those by which the soul is carried out towards the things 
that are in view, in approving of them, being pleased 
with thew, and inclined to them; or those in which the 
soul opposes the things that are in view, in disap-
proving of them, and in being displeased with them, averse 
from them, and rejecting them.3 
It will be seen.as Edwards's theory of the will develops, 
that he relies heavily upon his theory of the affections. For, 
as will be pointed out in a later section, Edwards uses the 
affections as the medium through which the will can be deter-
mined by the sovereign will of God. Although it would seem 
here that Edwards separates the will from the affections, yet 
actually, the will and the affections of the soul are not two 
faculties; the affections are not necessarily distinct from 
the will, nor do they differ from the action of the will, and 
inclination of the soul, 11 but only in the liveliness and 
2. Edwards., WPE, III, 3. 
3. Ibid., 3. 
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sensibleness of exercise.n4 
Edwards considered the mind as the proper nseat of the 
affections.n and it is the mind only which is capable of being 
pleased or displeased with its ideas. As it is the mind that 
thinks, so it is the mind that loves or hates, rejoices or is 
grieved at what it thinks of. 
In Edwards's treatise Religious Affections~ he points out 
the significant place that the affections are called upon to 
fill, not only in religion, but in all phases of experience. 
It is in the affections where the motive originates which 
eventually determines all action. The affections are insepar-
ably connected with deiire, and the greatest desire always de-
termines the choice of the will. This same thought is dis-
cussed in greater detail in The Freedom of the. Will where Ed-
wards states ftA man never, in any instance, wills anything 
contrary to his desires, or desires anything contrary to his 
will.n5 This clearly defined statement, arising out of his 
analysis of the will in relation to the affections, serves 
as a basic principle for Edwards's whole theory. 
says: 
Perry Miller, in Jonathan Edwards, is justified when he 
The core of the Freedom of the Will is the assertion of 
the uni-fary and functional nature of the organism. If 
the will is that by which the mind chooses, it is.~ not 
a faculty or a talent or a knack, but it is the man 
chqosing ... Desire is the will, and the will is the 
4. Edwards, WPE, III, 3. 
5. Edwards, WPE, II, 2. 
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emotions. The connection o~ stimulus to reaction is not 
arrested while the reason take$ stock., but· nsuch an 
alteration instantly ~ollows. n6 
Edwards is clear in asserting that even though there may 
be various ~actors which make up the structure of mind, yet 
the mind functions as a whole, never in separate parts. As 
was previously pointed out, there are several ~actors which 
enter into the experience o~ knowing or willing--such as the 
intellect and the will--but these ~aculties work so that each 
is the necessary cause o~ the other. 
The a~fections not only determine the direction in which 
the mind chooses, but there are also direct results .in the 
physical body as a result o~ the af~ections--even though as 
Edwards points out, the affections are not dependent upon any 
physical stimulus. 
Edwards says: 
As it is the soul only that has ideas, so it is the soul 
only that is pleased or displeased with its ideas. As it 
is the soul only that thinks, so it is the soul only that 
loves or hates, rejoices or is grieved at what it thinks. 
o~. Nor are these motions. of the animal spirits, and 
~luids o~ the body, anything properly belonging to the 
nature o~ the a~~ections, though they always accompany 
them, in the present state; but are only e~fects or con-
comitants o~ the a~fections that are entirely distinct 
~rom the a~fections themselves, and no way essential to 
them; so that an unbodied spirit may be as capable of 
love and hatred, joy or sorrow~ hope or ~ear~ or other 
affections, as one that is united to a body. r 
2. Memory 
The belie~ that nothing can happen without a cause is no 
6. Miller, JE, 255w 
7. Edwards., \VPE, III, 4. 
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less true in the area of psychology, according to Edwards. 
Although memory is discussed briefly, yet it is made to per-
form a major function in his system in relation to the deter-
mination of the will. Memory connects the past with the pre-
sent in such a way that the total content of past experience, 
either consciously or unconsciously, is brought into focus 
with each act of the will. Thus, no choice is ever a free 
choice. Rather, the choice is already determined by the con-
tent of past experience, and what appears to be free choice, 
is only the act of choosing what already has been determined. 
It is memory that makes this possible. 
Memory is a major determining factor in the formation of 
motives. A particular motive is determined by the content of· 
memory, and without memory, a choice could have no moral sig-
nificance. Edwards affirms that "It is that motive, which, as 
it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, that de-
termines the will.n8 But Edwards's definition of motive does. 
not have the meaning of 11 intention'~' or nintent'', as so com-
monly used. For instance, to ask 11What was his motive in this 
particular crime?" would be to use 'motive with the meaning of 
intent. Rather, by motive, Edwards had reference to the total 
content of past experience, made conscious by the function of 
memory, which enters into every act of will. Edwards says: 
By motive, I mean the whole of that which moves, excites 
or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one 
8. Edwards, WPE, II, 4. 
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thing singly, or many things conjuctly. Many particular 
things may concur and unite their strength to induce the 
mind; And, when it is so, all together are as it were 
one complex motive. And when I speak of the strongest 
motive, I have respect to the strength of the whole that 
operates to induce to a particular act of volition, 
whether that b~ the strength of one thing alone, or of 
many together • "} 
Thus, the major performance of memory takes place in the 
formation of motives, which in turn, are not only the causes 
which provoke the will to make choices, but also direct the 
will in its choices according to whatever is the strongest 
motive. 
Edwards's own definition of memory does not state ad-
equately the scope of its function. However, it can readily 
be seen that memory forms a necessary link in the chain of 
factors which finally determines the will. 
Memory is the identity, in some degree, of Ideas that 
we formerly had in our minds, with a consciousness that 
we formerly had them, and a supposition that their form-
er being in the mind is the cause of their being in us 
at present. There is not only the presence of the same 
ideas, that were in our minds formerly, but also, an 
act of the judgment, that they were there formerly, and 
that judgment, not properly from proof, but from natural 
necessity, arising from a Law of nature which God hath 
fixed • .lO 
At least one reason why Edwards was not more specific 
in defining the psychological principles involved in his 
system, was the fact that psychology as a science, did not 
then exist. In fact, Edwards has even been given the credit 
of being the first to formulate a psychology of religion.ll It 
is remarkable in itself that Edwards saw the need of giving 
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9. Edwards, V'J'PE, II, 4. 11. See Brightman, FOR, 3 . 
10. Edwards Notes on the Mind, in Dwight, LOE 680. 
a psychological explanation for his theory of the will, even 
though he failed to make a complete analysis. 
3. Consciousness 
Consideration of Edwards's theory of affections and mem-
ory leads to a third topic, his· theory of consciousness. 
Edwards says: 
Consciousness is the mind perceiving what is. in itself--
ideas, actions, passions, and everything that is there 
perceptible. It is a sort of feeling within itself. The 
mind feels when it thinks; so it feels when it discerns, 
feels when it loves, and feels when it hates.l2 
Edwards thought of consciousness in direct connection 
with the affections. He might well have defined consciousness 
as the mind being aware of its affections. For Edwards, the 
affections are the content of consciousness. Each thought of 
the mind expresses some affection. He uses the term conscious-
ness very discreetly, but when he does use it, it is always 
found in connection with some aspect of the affections or of 
some particular feeling. For ·instance, when speaking about the 
greatness of the power of God, Edwards says: 
But if the saints know this power by experience, then 
they feel it and discern it, and are conscious of it; 
as sensibly distinguishable from the natural operations 
of their own minds.l3 
Thus consciousness, for Edwards, is the immediate expe-
rience of some particular affection which is discernible in 
e sense. There is no act o:f the mind in which there is not an 
12. Edwards, Notes on the Mind, in Dwight, LOE, 680. 
13. Edwards, VJPE, III, 31. 
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accompanying affection--an affection either in favor of, or 
against the particular act. 
Consciousness has a vital function not ohly to psychol-
ogy but also to metaphysics. Consciousness is the key to 
reality for, as Edwards observes, the final analysis of all 
being results in a mental existence. He says: 
ness. 
But we know, that the things that are objects of this 
sense, all that the mind views by seeing, are merely 
mental Existences ... How impossible is it, that the world 
should exiNt from Eternity, without a Mind •.. hence we 
learn the necessity of the Eternal Existence of an All-
comprehensive Mind; and that it is the complication of 
all contradictions to deny such a Mind..l4 
Edwards defined personal identity in terms of conscious-
Identity of person consists in identity of conscious-
ness. A mind or spirit is nothing else but conscious-
ness, and what is included in it.l5 
Anyone reading such a statement today would call Ed-
wards a personalist. 
14~ Edwards, Notes on the Mind, in Dwight, LOE, 66~8-.669. 
15. Ibid., 680. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 
Some insight into Edwards's epistemology is necessary 
:ror the purposes o:r this thesis. Edwards's thought on the 
problem o:r knowledge is greatly inf'luenced by the system o:r 
John Locke. Unique in Edwards's system is his use o:r intu-
ition. Through intuition he shows that the mind has an im-
mediate awareness o:r spiritual truths and comprehends aes-
thetic per:rection. We start with sense experience, but this: 
is not the end o:r knowledge; we ascend to reason and then to 
revelation as represented by the divine light o:r God. 
1. Source o:r Knowledge 
Edwards held that knowledge originates in sensation and 
re:rlection. In this he probably :followed Locke:, although he 
does not :follow him all the way. For Edwards did not suppose 
that the mind was a blank tablet nor that sensation and re-
:flection supply the mind with the nraw material 11 o:r knowledge. 
On the other hand, Edwards says,: 
Our perceptions, or ideas that we passively receive, by 
our bodies, are communicated to us' immediately by God, 
while our minds are united with our bodies.l 
1. Edwards, Notes on the Mind, in Dwight, LOE, 679. 
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The primitive certainty of knowledge which is; possible 
on the perceptual level is based upon intuition. By intuition 
Edwards meant an immediate awareness. 
Harvey Townsend notes2 several illustrations of what Ed-
wards would call intuitions: (1) sensation--telling about a 
sensation is not the same as having it--rras honey is sweet 
on the tonguen; (2) rational inference--the relation of judg-
ments in implication must also be obtained by intuition;. ( 3) 
aesthetic appreciation--the beauty of form or comeliness of 
a person or the symmetry and balance of a just man's life 
must be enjoyed to be known. 
The three illustrations of intuition represent the three 
levels of knowledge in Edwards's. system. Although intuition is 
present in all three, yet it serves a different purpose in 
each. On the perceptual level, or the level of sensation, 
intuition serves to verify the fact that something is given, 
or the presence of a ~1thereness." On the next 1 evel, the 1 evel 
of understanding and reason, intuit_~on serves to judge the 
truth or error of propos,itions .• Edwards sr;r~~ that this is 
judging by self-evidence. The third level of intuition in-
volves an aesthetic element whereby the mind responds favor-
able to aesthetic harmony or excellency, and is repelled by 
the opposite. 
The: perceptual level of knowledge, or the level of in-
tuitive awareness, is not to be confused with the level of 
2. Townsend, PIUS, 41. 
understanding and reason. Furthermore, it should not be con-
fused with the divine light, which as Edwards points out in 
a sermon "A Divine and Supernatural Light 11 is a third and 
rarer means of intellectual insight. 
On the level of understanding and reason, Edwards ob-
serves that man is capable of arriving at certain truth 11 eithe 
immediately, by only looking on the propositions, which is 
judging by intuition and self-evidence; or by putting to-
gether several propositions, which are already evident by in-
tuition.n3 However, the level of reason and understanding 
makes. possible a very limited source of knowledge. 
The third source of knowledge, according to Edwards, is. 
the divine light. He develops this idea by noting first a few 
things in which this divine light does not consist. 1. It is: 
not those convictions that men may have of their sin and 
misery. 2. It does not consist in a mere impression upon the 
imagination. 3. It does not consist in any new truths or 
propositions not contained in the word of God. 4. It does not. 
consist in every affecting view that men have of the things 
of religion. 
Positively stated, this divine light consists in: 
A true sense of the divine excellency of the things re-
vealed in the word of God, and a conviction of the truth 
of them thence arising ••• So that this conviction of their 
truth is an effect and natural conseq_uence of this sight 
of their divine glory.4 
3 • Edwards, VVPE (Dwight,) , VII, 261 • 
4. Edwards, WPE, IV, 441. 
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In the divine light one sees the Significance of God, 
Jesus., and the event of creation. There is not only a spec-
ulative judgment that God is gracious, but a conviction that 
God is amiable on that account. Furthermore, there is a sense 
of the beauty of this; attribute in God. Edwards says: 
There is a twofold understanding or knowledge of good 
that God has made the mind of man capable of. The :first, 
that which is merely speculative and notional; as when 
a person only speculatively judges that anything is ••• 
and the other is that which consists in the sense of the 
heart; as when there is a sense o:f the beauty, amiable-
ness or ·sweetness of a thing; so that the heart is sen-
sible of pleasure and delight in the presence o:f the 
idea of it. In the former is exercised merely the spec-
ulative faculty, or the understanding, strictly so called 
In the: latter, the will, or inclination, or heart, is 
mainly concerned.5 · 
Here Edwards endeavors to point out a distinction be-
tween having an opinion that God is holy and gracious, and 
having a sense of the loveliness and beauty of that holiness. 
and grace. For example, Edwards observes that there is. a 
great difference between having a rational judgment that honey 
is sweet, and having a sense of its sweetness. A man may have 
the former, without ever having known the taste of honey it-
self. 
There is a wide difference between mere speculative 
rational judging any thing to be excellent, and having 
a sense of its sweetness and beauty. The former rests 
only in the head, speculation only is concerned in it; , 
but the heart iS; concerned in the latter. When the heart 
is sensible of the beauty and amiableness of a thing, it 
necessarily feels pleasure in the apprehension.6 
5 • Edwards, WPE, IV, L~42 • 
6 • Ibid. , 442. 
2. Criteria or Truth 
Edwards makes use of at least three criteria of truth in 
his epistemology. The: first of these criteria, consistency, 
follows from his basic assertion that our perceptions are 
given to us directly by God. Since Edwards identifies. God wit 
real existence, it follows that nruth lies in the consistency 
of our ideas with existence. Edwards says: 
To explain what this. existence is, is another thing. 
In abstract ideas, it is nothing but the ideas them-
selves; s.o that their truth is their consistency with 
themselves: •.. So that truth, in these things:, is an 
agreement of our ideas with that series in God. It is 
existence; and that is all that we can say. It is: exist-
ence; and that is. all that we can say. It is impos-
sible that we should explain a perfectly abstract and 
mere idea of existence; only we always find this. ..• 
that God and real existence are the same. 7 
The q_ues.tion as to whether Edwards's use of consistency 
was identical with Locke:' s use of it receives the following 
comment from Townsend: 
Nevertheless, Edwards took Locke's principle of con-
sistency am.o-9-g our ideas. half-heartedly. When he fEd-
wards_? spoke of consistency he meant the consistency 
of our ideas with existence. Consistency for Locke was 
a rather.formal doctrine, because of the implicit cleav-
age between our ideas on the one hand and the world of 
things-in-themselves. on the other. Such a cleavage Eel-
wards s.imply did not make, either consciously or un-
consciously •.. For him the postulate of the understanding 
was an understandable reality. He saw the problem. and 
the probable a~swer more clearly than Kant did a half 
century later. 
A second criterion of truth is found in the perception 
of the relations there are between ideas. All truth is. in 
7. Edwards, Notes on the Mind, in Dwight, LOE, 688. 
8. Towns end, PillUS, 42. 
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the mind, and only there. Edwards says that it is ideas, or 
what is in the mind alone, that can be the object of the mind. 
Falsehood consists in an inconsistent supposition of re-
lations. The truth that is in a mind, must be in that mind 
as to its object, and everything pertaining to it. The only 
foundation of error is inadequateness and imperfection of 
ideas; for, as Edwards observes, if the idea were perfect, it 
would be impossible but that all its relations should be 
perfectly perceived. The criterion of truth us.ed here could 
well be called coherence or adeq_uacy. 
A third criterion of truth is: found in the aesthetic 
element which enters into experiences of perception. As one 
views God's creations, he is~ moved by their supreme excel-
lency. Edwards says.: 
A true sense of the divine excellency of the things of 
God's word doth more directly and immediately convince 
of the truth of them; and that because the excellency 
of these things is so superlative. There is a beauty in 
them that is so divine and Godlike, that is greatly and 
evidently distinguishing of them from things merely 
human, or that men are the: inventors. and authors of; a 
glory that is so high and great, that when clearly seen, 
commands assent to their divinity and reality ••• They 
believe the doctrines of God's word to be divine, be-
cause they see divinity in them.9 
3. Revelation Superior to Reason 
Although reason is the necessary medium through which 
God's. divine light is revealed to man's consciousness, yet 
it must not be overlooked that reason in itself cannot be a 
9 • Edwards., vVPE, IV, 44 3·. 
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substitute for revelation. Edwards affirms this doctrine in 
an essay rtThe· Insufficiency of Reason as a Substitute !Bor 
Revelation. ·n In this essay Edwards criticizes the view which 
makes reason supreme in the knowledge process. Although mak-
ing a place for reason, he defends the supremacy of revela-
tion. 
Edwards is convinced that truth ultimately is the pro-
duct of God's illumination, and that God's attempt to make 
himself known to man completely overshadows any attempt of 
mants own initiative. Furthermore, this divine illumination 
is immediately imparted by God, and not obtained by natural 
means. Edwards does not mean that the natural faculties are 
not made use of in the process. The natural faculties are 
the subject of this illumination, and in such a manner that 
they are not merely passive, but rather they are active. God 
in letting this light into the soul deals with man according 
to hiS' nature as a rational creature, and makes use of his 
human abilities. This, however, does not mean that God is 
any less the cause of the illumination. For illustration, 
Edwards compares the revelation of God to the sun making 
possible sight to the eyes. Our eyes are necessary for the 
observation of objects, but the eyes are not the source of 
the light whereby we are able to see. So with God's revelatior. 
of truth. Our minds are the· necessary subjects of God;'~s di-
vine light, but yet the mind in itself could not have made 
_3._8 
that light possible. Edwards says: 
\~en it is said that this light is given immediately by 
God, and not obtained by natural means, hereby is in-
tended that it is given by God without making use of 
any means that operate by their own power, or a natural 
force. God makes use of means; but it is not as mediate 
causes to produce this effect. There are not truly any 
second causes of it; but it is' produced by God immediate-
ly.lO 
Turning to reason, Ed.wards defines it as: 
That power or faculty an intelligent being has to judge 
of the truth of propositions; either immediately, by 
only looking on the propositions, which is judging by 
intuition and self-evidence; or by putting together 
several propositions, which are already evident by intu-
ition, or at least whose evidence is originally derived 
from intuition.ll 
Edwards doe:s not deny that certain propositions, known 
only by reason, can manifest truth. From these propositions, 
other propositions may be inferred. However, he is not so 
much impressed by these propositions, as by those "infinitely 
numerous propositions.n received by men as truth, but which 
defy verification or explanation by the use of reason. Man 
finds himself in a universe which has law and order. But to 
deny the truth of such law and order, because it cannot be 
rationally explained, is to Edwards an instance of stubborn 
ignorance. 
How unreasonable would it be to say, that we must first 
know those things to be true by reason, before we give 
credit to our experience of the truth of them.l2 
For example, Edwards shows the limits of reason in the 
10. Edwards, WPE, IV, 444. 
ll. Edwards, WPE(Dwight), VII, 261. 
12 •. Ibid., 263. 
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relationship of the body and the' mind. How one affects the 
other is a process which reason does not make clear, yet no 
one dares deny that a living body has perception, understands, 
and exerts thought, volition, love and hatred. 
Edwards· says: 
It is evident, by experience; that rrsomething how is." 
But this proposition is, attended with things that reason 
cannot comprehend, paradoxes that seem contrary to reason 
For, if something now is, then eithe·r Something was from 
all eternity; or something began to be, without any cause 
or reason of its existence.l3 
Edwards holds that no matter how one attempts to solve 
the problems. of duration, creation, interaction--or the exist-
ence of affections of many kinds--one ends in a complete dilem 
ma, i.e., assuming that one sticks only to the facts. that rea-
s.on can offer for explanation. 
On the other hand, Edwards admits a paradox when he turns 
to revelation. He says: 
It may well be expected, that a revelation of truth, 
concerning an infinite being, should be attended with 
mystery. We find, that the reasonings and conclusions 
of the best metaphysicians and mathematicians, concern-
infinities, are attended with paradoxes and seeming in-
consistencies .• Thus it is: concerning infinite lines, sur-
faces, and solids, which are things external. But much 
more may this be expected in infinite spiritual things; 
such as infinite will, love, and joy •.• Nothing is more 
certain, than that there must be an unmade and unlimited 
being; and yet, the very notion of such a being is all 
mystery, involving nothing bft incomprehensible· paradoxes 
and seeming inconsistencies. 4 
Edwards: does not attempt to account for the fact that 
there appear to be unexplained portions of God's revelation. 
13. Edwards, WPE(Dwight), VII, 263. 
14. Ibid., 271. 
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He cites the ways of nature as a similar situation. Even as 
there are parts of the system of nature that are little under-
stood--and yet certainly have their purpose--so with the sys-
tem of revelation. Edwards is convinced that revelation is of 
prime necessity, overshadowing the importance of reason. How-
ever, reason must have its place, for without reason there 
can be no revelation. 
There is a sense in which Edwards's theory of knowledge 
ties in with what is known as general and specific revelation. 
General revelation is seen in Edwards's use of nature and. the 
constitution of the mind. as means to obtaining knowledge. On 
the other hand., specific revelation finds expre·ssion in the 
divine light whereby man attains spiritual insights which 
would be impossible on the level of general revelation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FREEDOM AND NECESSITY 
l. Freedom Defined 
In Freedom of the Will is found the heart of Edwards's: 
thought about freedom and ·determinism. In summi.J?.g up what he 
considers to be the essential contribution of this work, 
Perry Miller says: 
The core of the Freedom of the Will is. the assertion 
of the, unitary and :functional nature of the organis.m.l 
It was upon this foundation that Edwards constructed 
his philosophy of the will. 
Edwards's own definition of freedom is not unusual. The 
marked similarity of Edwards's conception of liberty to that 
of John Locke is a fact which s,hould be noted, particularly 
throughout this chapter. However, the manner in which Ed-
wards reconciles this definition with other seemingly con-
trary conclusions presents a problem having interest and chal-
lenge. 
Edwards says: 
The plain and obvious meaning o:f the words freedom and 
liberty, in common speech, is: power, opportunity or ad-
vantage., that any one has, to do as he pleases. Or in 
l. Miller, JE, 255. 
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other words, his being free from hinderance or impedi-
ment in the way of doing, or conducting in any respect, 
as he wills. And the contrary to liberty, whatever we 
call that by, is a person's: being hindered or unable to 
c<:mdu~t as he will, or being necessitated to do othe-r-
WlSe. 
Edwards observes that any being not possessed with a 
will, cannot have any power or opportunity of doing according 
to its will, nor be required to act contrary to its will, 
nor be hindered from acting agreeably to it. To speak of liber 
ty or freedom, or the contrary, as belonging to the will it-
self, is not to speak good sense, according to Edwards. 
For the will itself is not an agent that has a will: The 
power of choosing itself, has not a power of choosing. 
That which has the power of volition or choice is the 
man or the soul, and not the power of volition itself. 
And he that has the liberty of doing according to his 
will, is the agent or doer who is possessed of the will, 
and not the will which he is possessed of.3 
Edwards is careful to define freedom in such a way that 
the definition does not include any thing of the cause or 
origin of the ohoices that are made. Freedom is the man choos-
ing; but man himself is, not free. The power and opportunity 
for one to do and act as he will, or according to his choice, 
is what is meant by freedom, but this does not aL all explain 
how the person came to have such a volition; whether it was 
caused by some external motive or internal bias; whether it 
was determined by some internal antecedent volition, or wheth-
er it happened without a cause; whether it was, necessarily 
2. Edwards, WPE, II, 3. 
3. Edwards,, VV"PE, II, 18. 
connected with something foregoing, or not connected. 
The view or freedom held by Edwards is openly opposed to 
that held by Arminians and Pelagians--the noted opponents or 
Calvinism. Edwards's criticism or his, opponents centers a-
round three or their central affirmations. 
l. That freedom consists: in a self-determining :power in 
the will, or a certain sovereignty the will has over itself, 
and its, own acts, whereby it determines its own volitions; so 
as not to be dependent in its determinations on any cause out-
side itself nor determined by any thing :prior to its own acts. 
Against this view, Edwards held that there are certain factors 
which condition the will and thus make it im:poss~ible for the 
will to be autonomous. Moreover, if man :possessed complete 
autonomy he would be as God, and to Edwards, this was a view 
both impious and unreasonable. 
2. That indifference belongs to freedom; or, the mind 
:previous to the act or volition, is in a certain state or 
equilibriwn. In reply, Edwards asserted that our motives are 
never :perfectly balanced, and what we choose, we must choose 
necessarily. Edwards cites the example or a man touching a 
square on a chessboard and indicates how this action was de-
termined by :previous associations. There is no such thing as 
pure indeterminism, or, in other words, two equally desirable 
alternatives. To think or freedom apart from the act or choos-
ing itself is to think or freedom in terms' or abstractions. 
Actual life situations reveal that in every instance or choice, 
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, one alternative finally has more appeal than the other, and 
thus if a man chooses, he chooses necessarily. 
J. That contingency belongs to the will, and is essential 
to it; not according to the common use of the word, but using 
contingency in the sense of being opposed to all necessity, 
or any fixed and certain connection with some previous ground 
or reason of its existence. Contrary to this third assertion 
held by his opponents, Edwards was convinced that there is 
a necessary relationship between cause and effect; and that 
man's choices are determined necessarily--not by his own free 
choice--but by the strongest. motive which is presented to the 
will; which motive, Edwards says, has ultimately found its 
source in God. 
To suppose the essence of freedom to consist in the 
three propositions affirmed by the, Arminians and Pelagians, 
was to Edwards an unwarra_nted conclusion, and one which was 
contrary to all experience. For him, freedom was the man 
choosing, but further than this he did not go. 
2. Freedom only Apparent 
In his essay "The Manifest Inconsistence of the Arminian 
Notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in the Will's Self-de-
termining Power'' Edwards seeks to show the unreasonableness 
of the Arminian view of freedom. Edwards says: 
And first of all, I shall consider the notion of a self-
determining power in the will; wherein, according to the 
Arminians, does most essentially consist the will's 
freedom; and shall particularly inquire, whether it be 
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not plainly absurd, and a manifest inconsistence, to 
suppose that the will itself determines all the free 
acts of the will.4 
Edwards asserts that there is an absurdity in the state-
ment "an act of a free will. n He points out that in all cases 
when we speak of the powers or principles of acting, as doing 
such things, we mean that the agents which have these powers 
of acting, do them in the exercise of those powers. So when 
we say that valor fights courageously, we mean, the man who 
is under the influence of valor fights courageously. When we 
say that love seeks the object loved, we mean, the person 
loving seeks that object. When we say that the understanding 
discerns, we mean, the soul discerns in the exercise of that, 
faculty. So when it is said that the will decides or deter-
mines, the meaning must be, that the person in the exercise 
of a power of willing, determines. 
Therefore, Edwarrtta reasons, if the will. determines all 
its own free acts, but at the same time the soul determines 
all the free acts of the will in the exercise of a power of 
willing, then the will determines its own acts by choosing 
its own acts. If the will determines the will, then the choice 
orders and determines the choice. If this, process continues, 
there must come at last an original act of the will, deter-
mining the consequent acts, wherein the will is not self-de-
termined and so does not perform a free act. If the first act 
4. Edwards, WPE, II, 20. 
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in the chain of choices, determining and fixing the rest, is. 
not free, then one must conclude that none of the following 
choices can in any sense be called free. 
If that first volition is not determined by any pre-
ceding act of the will, then that act is not determined 
by the will, and so is not free in the Arminian notion 
of fre~dom, which consists in the will's. self-determin-
ation.) 
Edwards, here, is. denying the possibility that there 
is a capacity within the individual to weigh alternatives and 
make a de~ision purely relative to those alternatives and 
nothing more. Furthermore, he denies that even in choosing 
one alternative there is an awareness that the other could 
have been chosen equally as well. Edwards says: 
If to evade the force of what has been observed, it 
should be said, that when the Arminians speak of the 
will's determining its own acts, they do not mean that 
the will determines its acts by any preceding act, or 
that one act of the will determines another; but only 
that the faculty or power of will, or the soul in the 
use of that power, determines its own volitions; and 
that it does it without any act going before the act 
determined; such an evasion would be full of gross ab-
surdity. I confess, it is, an evasion of my own invent-
ing, and I do not know but I should wrong the Armin:ians 
in supposing that any of them would make use of it.b 
Edwards is convinced that a contradiction exists between 
the two Arminian views: one, that the will determines volition 
the other, that no act of the ·will exists preceding the voli-
tion determined. For if a certain power of choosing determines 
volition by choosing it, then here is the act of volition 
5. Edwards, ~~E, II, 21. 
6. Ibid. , 23 • 
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determined by an antecedent choice, choosing that volition. 
No one denies that the will exerts itself in order to produce 
an effect, which effect is the determination of volition. 
But certainly this exertion or action is. not the same as the 
effect. Rather, it is s.omething prior to it. 
The aim of Edwards was to find support for his con-
clusion that the Arminians were wrong in asserting the self-
determination of the will. To accomplish that aim, Edwards 
sought to identify some cause or power--not the will itself--
which determined the.choices that man might make. If this 
power could be found, Edwards was convinced that freedom, in 
the Arminian sense of it, would become nothing more than an 
abstraction. The existence of this. power was essential in the 
system of Edwards. He says: 
If the will determine itself, then either the will is 
active in determining its volitions, or it is not. If 
it be active in it, then the determination is an act of 
the will; and so there is one act of the will determin-
ing another. But if the will is. not active in the deter-
mination, then how does it exercise any liberty in it? 
These gentlemen _L'Arminians_7 suppose that the thing 
wherein the will exercises liberty, is in its determin-
ing its own acts. But how can this be, if it be not active 
in determining? Certainly the will, or the soul, cannot 
exercise any liberty in that wherein it doth not act, or 
wherein it doth not exercise itself. So that if either 
part of this dilemma be taken, this scheme of liberty, 
consisting in self-determining power, is overthrown. If 
there be an act of the will in determining all its own 
free acts, then one free act of the will is determined 
by another; and so we have the absurdity of every free 
act, even the very first, determined by a foregoing free 
act. But if there be no act or exercise of the will in 
determining its own acts, then no liberty is exercised 
in determining them. From whence it follows, that no 
liberty consists in the will's power to determine its 
own acts; or, which is the same thing, that there is no 
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such thing as liberty consisting in a self-determining 
power of the will.? 
Edwards would not agree with the statement rrThe essence 
of a moral situation is will, and the essence of will is 
choice. u8 In the thought of Edwards there is significant dis-
tinction between the words nwill n and rt choice." As Edwards 
defines it "The will is no otherwise different from the in-
clination.n9 On the: other hand, choice is nothing more than 
the acceptance of whatever has: been determined in the will. 
The act of choosing has no moral significance. True, there is: 
causal connection between will and choice, for the present 
inclination of the will determines the nature of the. choice,. 
But choice, according to this use of it, has lost its real 
meaning. , 
Freedom in Edwards is nthe· man choosingrr but the nature 
of a particular choice is determined necessarily, not volun-
tarily. Freedom becomes only an apparent reality. Man is not 
a free: moral agent, nor is he to be judged ultimately on the' 
basis of the choices made throughout his life •. Contrary to 
the Ar.minian view of freedom, Edwards asserts that if man 
were to possess real freedom, it would necessitate a lowered 
concept of Godts divine nature. In attributing absolute 
sovereignty to God, Edwards is convinced that onets view of' 
God is heightened to a point beyond which it would be possible 
7. Edwards, vVPE, II, 23 
8. Brightman, ML, 74. 
9. Edwards, Notes ontheMindi, inDwight, LOE, 693. 
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to reach if man were a free moral agent. 
In proposing this view of freedom, with its accompanying 
moral implications, Edwards is being purely Calvinistic. Ed-
wards would agree with the statement of Calvin which says: 
In conformity ••. to the clear doctrine of the Scripture, 
we assert, that by an eternal and immutable counsel, 
God has once f.or all determined, both whom he would ad-
mit to salvation, and whom he would condemn to destruc-
tion. We· affirm that this counsel, as far as concerns 
the elect, is founded on his gratuitous mercy, totally 
irrespective of human merit; but that to those whom he 
denotes to condemnation, the fate of life is clos.ed by 
a jusf and irreprehensible, but incomprehensible judg-
ment. 0 
In approving of that statement, both Calvin and Edwards 
seem blind to the fact that it is an appeal to irrationality, 
makes God the author of moral evil (which Edwards in V.JPE, II, 
155, denies to be true), makes God will something evil in 
order to bring praise to his name, and makes man a puppet in 
the hands. of a sovereign God. But in the mind of Edwards par-
ticularly, such a view of God was pleasant, even at the sac-
rifice of moral freedom. 
3. Necessity 
i. Philosophical 
It is essential to have some idea of Edwards's view of 
necessity in order to give a proper evaluation of his theory 
of the will t He is convinced that necessity is not incon-
sistent with liberty, and. sets out to prove this assertion. 
10. Calvin, ICR, III, xxi, 7. 
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Edwards says: 
Metaphysical or philosophical necessity is nothing dif-
ferent from .•• the certainty that is in things. themselves,, 
which is the foundation of the certainty of them ••• is. 
really nothing else than the full and fixed connection 
between the things signified by the subject and predi-
cate of a proposition, which affirms something to be 
true. When there is such a connection, then the thing 
affirmed in the proposition is necessary, in a phil-
osophical sense; whether any opposition, or contrary 
effort be supposed, or supposable in the case, or no. 
When the subject and predicate of the propos.ition, which 
affirms the existence of any thing, either substance, 
quality, act of circumstance, have a full and certain 
connection, then the existence or being of that thing 
is said to be necessary in a metaphysical sense.ll 
Edwards notes that things which are perfectly connected 
with other things that are necessary, are necessary themselves 
by a necessity of consequence. Thus all future events, which 
can be said to be necessary, are necessary in only the fore-
going sense. The only way that any event that is to come to 
pass hereafter, is or can be necessary, is by a connection 
with something that is necessary in its own nature. God is; a 
perfect example of that which acts necessarily, because of 
the very perfection within his: own nature. This fact implies 
no inferiority or dependence in God himself, nor any want of 
dignity, privilege, or ascendency. It is. not inconsistent 
with the absolute and most perfect sovereignty of God. The 
sovereignty of God is his ability and authority to do what 
pleases him whereby 11He doth according to his will in the 
armies of Heanen, and among the inhabitants of the earth, and 
11. Edwards, ~~E, II, 11. 
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none can stay his hand, or say unto him, what doest thou?n 
(Daniel 4,: 35). 
The question as to whether God has a reason for doing 
what pleases him is one that Edwards does.not answer. How-
ever, it would seem by the necessary perfection of God's 
nature that he could not be pleased .by the arbitrary and ir-
rational. What pleases God is als:o what is. most reasonable. 
ii. Moral Necessity 
The phrase, moral necessity, is used variously; some-
times it is used for a necessity of moral obligation .• 
So we say, a man is: under necessity of moral obligation 
when he is under bonds of duty and conscience, which he 
cannot be discharged from .•. Sometimes by moral neces-
sity is meant that apparent connection of things, which 
is the ground of moral evidence; and so is distinguished 
from absolute necessity, or that sure connection of 
things, that is a foundation for infallible certainty •.• 
And sometimes by moral necessity is meant that neces.-
sity of connection and consequence, which arises from 
such moral causes, as the strength of inclination, or 
motives, and the connection which there is in many cases. 
between these, and such certain volitions. and actions.l2 
There is a sense in which moral necessity may be abso-
lute. Often an effect is so perfectly connected with its 
moral cause that the choice involved is. an instance of neces.-
sity. Edwards notes also that there is always a "strongest 
motive" that enters: into every moral situation, and in no 
instance can the will go against the strongest motive pre-
sent ed to it • 
Even in the nature of God there is a nstrongest motiverr 
12. Edwards, \fl,rpE, II, 13. 
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which governs all his actions. Furthermore, God is free only 
in the sense of acting according to this strongest motive. 
In the mind of God, the strongest motive, that which is most 
reasonable, and that which pleases him most are all identical. 
iii. Natural Necessity 
By natural necessity, Edwards means such necessity as 
men are under through the force of natural causes, as dis-
tinguished from moral causes, such as habits and disposi-
tions of the heart, moral inducement and motives. The forces 
of nature exert a certain necessity upon man in which there 
is no experience of choosing. Edwards notes that the word 
nature is· often used in opposition to choice. 
Not because nature has indeed never any hand in our 
choices; but this probably comes to pass from that dis-
cernible and obvious course of events, which we ob-
serve in·many things that our choice has no concern in; 
and especially in the material world; which in very many 
parts of it, we easily perceive to be in a settled 
course; the stated order and manner of succession being 
very apparent.l3 
13. Edwards, WPE, II, 15. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
WILL 
l. Strongest Motive Determines Will 
In Edwards's terminology, the will is that faculty by 
which the mind chooses anything. An act of the will is the· 
same as an act of choice. This definition of will is practi-
cally identical with that of .John Locke. Locke defines will 
as nthat power which the mind ha's thus to order the consider-
ation of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it."l Or 
as Locke defines it again, "The will signifies nothing but 
a power or ability to prefer or choose.n2 
Edwards notes that in no instance does a man ever will 
anything contrary to his desires, or desire anything contrary 
to his will. The thing which he wills, the very same he de-
sires; and he does not will a thing, and desire· the contrary 
in any particular. It should be observed, however, that will 
may be contrary to desire in the same thing, or with respect 
to the very same object of will and desire:. But here the ob-
jects are two; and in each, taken by itself, the will and 
1. Locke, Essay, 162. (In Locke Selections by Scribner's) 
2. Ibid., 164. 
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desire agree. The will may not agree with the will, nor de-
sire agree with desire, in different things. But concerning 
any one matter, the will and desire must always agree. 
The will, according to Edwards, is said to be determined, 
when, in consequence of some action or influence, its choice 
is directed to, and fixed upon a particular object. To speak 
of the determination of the· will supposes an effect which 
must have a cause. If the will is determined, there must be 
a determinelfr. This fact raises a problem for those who hold 
to a self-determined will, for then the will becorries both the 
determiner and that which is determined. The will is the 
cause that acts and. produces effects upon itself,. yet at the 
same time, it is the object of its own inflaence and action. 
This dilemma gave Edwards suf·ficient reason to deny the exist-
ence of a self-determined will. 
But, it may be asked, unless the will determines itself, 
what then determines it? Edwards replies, "It is that motive, 
which as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, 
that determines the will. n 3 
By motive, I mean the· whole of that which moves, excites, 
or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one 
thing singly, or many things conjunctly.4 
In speaking of the 11 strongest motiven, Edwards is think-
ing particularly of the strength of the whole that operates 
to induce the mind to a particular act of volition, whether 
3 • Edwards , WPE, II, 4. 
4. Ibid., 4. 
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that be the strength of one thing alone, or of many together. 
And I think it must also be allowed by all, that every 
thing that is properly called a motive, excitement or 
inducement to a perceiving, willing agent, has some 
sort and degree of tendency or advantage to move or ex-
cite the will, previous to the effect, or to the act of 
the will excited. This previous tendency of the motive 
is what I call the strength of the motive. '11hat motive 
which has a less degree of previous advantage or tenden-
cy to move the will, or that appears less inviting, as 
it stands in the view of the mind., is what I call. a 
weaker motive. On the contrary, that which appears most 
inviting, and has, by what appears concerning it to the 
understanding or apprehens.ion, the greatest degree of 
previous tendency to excite and induce the choice, is 
what I call the strongest motive. And in this sense, I 
suppose the5will is always determined by the strong-est motive. . 
According to Edwards, whatever is perceived or appre~-
hended by an intelligent and voluntary agent, which has the 
nature and influence of a motive to volition or choice, is 
considered as good. From this, Edwards concludes that the will 
is always as is the greatest apparent good. Good here is used 
in the sense of agreeableness. nTo appear good to the mind, 
as I use the phrase, is the same as to appear agreeable, or 
seem pleasing to the mind.n6 If anything tends to draw the 
inclination, or move the will, it must be something that is 
agreeable to the mind. The greatest apparent good is always 
that which stands: highest in the view of the mind and pleases 
it most. 
In identifying the will with that which seems to be the: 
greatest apparent good, or with what appears most agreeable, 
5. Edwards, WPE, II, 4 .. 
6. Ibid., 4 
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Edwards concludes that the will is determined by this greatest 
apparent good. For, as Edwards observes, it is most natural 
for the mind to choose what appears to be most agreeable and 
pleasant to itself. Several things are· noted which have spe-
cial appeal to the mind. First, certain objects are appeal-
ing to the mind by their nature and circumstances. Some ob-
jects possess qualities of beauty and pleasantness, whereas 
other objects have qualities offensive to the mind. Second-
ly, the degree of trouble or consequence attending a particu-
lar object helps to determine its effect upon the mind. Final-
ly, objects may be desired because of certain time factors. 
The pleasant object near in time is more attractive to the 
mind than a pleasant object farther removed in time. 
An important factor which enters into the experience of 
choosing is the degree of clearness attending the idea of the 
future event. At certain times the ideas we have of .things. 
by contemplation are much stronger and clearer than at other 
times .A.JD.an at one time has a stronger idea of the' pleasure 
which is to be enjoyed in eating some sort of :;t;~ood, than at 
another. Furthermore, the degree or strength of the idea 
that one has of future good.' an:d evil is another factor that 
has great influence on choice or volition. Edwards says: 
When of two kinds of future pleasure, which the mind 
considers of, and are presented for choice, both are 
supposed exactly equal by the judgment, and both equal-
ly certain, and all other things are equal, but only 
one of them is what the mind has a far more lively sense 
of, than of the other; this has the greatest advantage 
by far to affect and attract the mind, and move the. 
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will. It is now more agreeable to the mind, to take the 
pleasure it has a strong and lively sense or, than that 
which it has only a raint idea or. The view or the rorm-
er is attended with the strongest appetite, and the 
greatest uneasiness attends the want or it; and it is 
agreeable to the mind to have uneasiness removed, and 
its appetite gratiried.7 
Edwards is convinced that volition in no instance is 
otherwise than is the greatest apparent good. The choice or 
the mind never departs rrom that which at that time, and 
with respect to the direct and immediate object or that de-
cision or the mind, appears most agreeable and pleasing. In 
other words, it is the strongest motive which ultimately de-
termines the will. 
2~ The' Will in Relation to Cause and Errect 
Edwards asserts that nothing ever comes to pass without 
a cause. What is selr-existent must be rrom eternity, and 
must be unchangeable; but as to all things that begin to be, 
they are not selr-existent, and thererore must have some 
roundation or their existence outside or themselves .• 
A proper derinition or cause, according to Edwards, is. 
that which is used: 
• 
To signiry any antecedent, either natural or moral, 
positive or negative, on which an event •.. so depends 
that it is the ground and reason, ei~her in whole, or 
in part, why it is, rather than not. 
Edwards makes particular note or the words positive and 
negative in the foregoing QUotation. Negative factors can be 
7. Edwards , viJPE, II, 7 • 
8. Ibid. , 26. 
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causes of certain effects just as truly as positive factors. 
For instance, Edwards points out that the absence of the sun 
in the night, is not the cause of the falling of the dew in 
the same manner as its beams are the cause of the ascending 
of the vapors during the day; and its. withdrawal in the win-
ter, is not in the same manner the cause of the freezing of 
the waters, as its approach in the spring is the cause of 
their thawing. But, Edwards says, the withdrawal or absence 
of the sun is an antecedent, with ·which these effects in the 
night and winter are connected, and on which they depend, and 
is one thing that belongs to the ground and reason why they 
come to pass at that time, rather than at other times; though 
the absence of the Sun is nothing positive nor has any posi-
tive influence. 
In the same sense in which Edwards makes use of positive 
and negative, causes, he makes use of positive and negative 
effects. He ssry-s that in many instances, an effect is a conse-
q_uence of something which is more truly an occasion than a 
cause. 
In reference to cause, Edwards says: 
I am the more careful thus to explain my meaning, that 
I may Dut off occasion, from any that might seek occa-
sion to cavil and object against some things which I 
may say concerning the dependence of all things which 
come to pass, on some cause, and their connection with 
that cause.9 
From this conclus.ion, it follows that every act of the 
9. Edwards, V~E, II, 26. 
will, considered as an effect, must have a cause. But, Ed-
wards observes, i~ acts of the will are caused, then the will 
itself, according to the Arminian definition, cannot be free. 
So that it is indeed as repugnant to reason, to suppose 
that an act of the will should come into existence 
without a cause, as to suppose the human soul, or an 
angel, or the globe of the earth, or the whole universe, 
should come into existence without a cause.lO 
One might ask why man himself is not capable of exerting 
certain powers--one of those powers being the capacity to 
direct his own will? Edwards denies this possibility by say-
ing that if every act has a cause which precedes it, then 
either that cause began to be out of nothing or else it it-
self was the effect of a preceding cause~· To believe a cause 
could ·Come into being without a prior cause was to believe 
an absurdity. Yet, Edwards conclude~,those who believe that 
the will is f~ee or that man himself can determine his own 
choices, believe just such an absurdity. 
The only conclusion that satisfied Edwards was that which 
denied the existence of a_ free will, and asserted instead a 
will which wa's determined in each act by causes other then 
itself. 
Edwards says: 
So that if Arminian liberty of will, consisting in the 
willts determining its own acts, be maintained, the old 
absurdity and contradiction must be maintained, that 
every free act of the will is caused and determined by 
a foregoing free act of will; which doth not consist 
with the free acts aris.ing without any cause, and being 
10. Edwards, WPE, II, 29. 
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so contingent, as not to be fixed by any thing fore-
going. So that this evasion must be given up, as not 
at all relieving, aad as that which, instead of sup-
porting this sort of liberty, directly destroys; it ..• 
So let Arminians turn which way they please with their 
notion of liberty, consisting in the willrs determin-
ing its own acts; their notion destroys. its elf .11 
Some might question the way in which Edwards sought to 
establish his own view of the human will and its liberty. 
But to him, it was a serious matter and a deep-rooted per-
sonal conviction. The pleasure which he found in his earlier 
contemplations about the divine sovereignty of God had be-
come· even more sweet to him in later years. Seen from this· 
light, it is not difficult to understand the· motivating 
force which led him to his conclusions. 
3. The Will in Matters: of Indifference 
Edwards notes. that one of the stock arguments for the 
Arminian position is the suppos.ed experience we have of an 
ability to determine our wills in cases wh:erein no prevail-
ing motive is presented. The will appears. to have a choice 
between two or more things, that are perfectly equal in the 
view of the mind. But, Edwards observes, the very supposi-
tion which is here made directly contradicts and overthrows 
itself. 
For the thing supposed, wherein this grand argument con-
sis.ts, is, that among several things the·will actually 
chooses one before another, at the same time that it is 
perfectly indifferent; which is the very same thing as. 
11. Edwards, WPE, II, 33. 
to say, the mind has a :preference, at the' same time that 
it has no :pref'erence.l2 
Edwards denies the :possibility that the will may be :per-
fectly indifferent and yet at the same time be able to choose 
one of' the :possible alternatives .. For, he asserts, the very 
act of' choosing implies a :preference, and a :preference is 
directly contrary to indifference. 
Thus with those who find in indifference a basis for 
freedom, Edwards is in radical disagreement. Edwards was con-
vinced that to hold ffthat freedom consis;ts. in indifference, 
or in that equilibrium whereby the will is without all ante-
cedent determination or bias, and left hitherto free from 
any :prepossessing inclinationn1 3 was to be wholly unreason-
able. In dismay Edwards notes that by holding to his. position, 
he is going against certain great thinkers among Pelagians, 
Jesuits, Socians, and Arminians, but at the same time, glories 
in the fact that the great reformers Luther, Calvin, and 
Zwingli lend strong support to his :point of view. 
To affirm that the will is free from :predetermination, 
so much so, that there may be room for the exercise of' the 
self-determining :power of the will; and that the freedom of' 
the will consists in, or depends upon this vacancy and oppor-
tunity that is left for the will itself to be the determiner 
of the act that is to be the free act, is to believe in 
12. Edwards, WPE, II, 35. 
13. Ibid., 39. 
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freedom on very shallow frounds.. For, Edwards notes, to hold 
such a view of freedom demands that the indifference must be 
perfect and absolute. There must be a perfect freedom from 
all antecedent preponderation or inclination. Because if the 
will be already inclined, before it exerts its own sovereign 
power on itself, then its inclination is not wholly owing to 
itself. For if when two opposites are proposed to the will 
for its choice, the proposal does not find the will wholly 
in a state of indifference, then the will is not in posses-
sion of the power of self-determination. The least degree of 
antecedent bias in the mind is inconsistent with the Arminian 
notion of freedom. 
Edwards says: 
For so long as. prior inclination possesses. the will, and 
is not removed, it binds the will, so that it is ut-
terly impossible that the will should act or choose con-
trary to a remaining prevailing inclination of the will. 
To suppose ·otherwise, would be the same thing as to sup-
pose that the will is inclined contrary to its present 
prevailing inclination, or contrary to what it is in-
clined_to. That which the will chooses and prefers, that, 
all things considered, it preponderates and inclines to. 
It is equally impossible for the will to choose contrary 
to its own remaining and present preponderating inclin-
ation, as it is to prefer contrary to its own present 
preference, or choose contrary to its own present choice. 
The will, therefore, so long as it is under the influ-
ence of an old preponderating inclination is not at 
liberty for a new free act, oi any act that shall now be 
an act of self-determination. 4 
Edwards holds that if there be the least degree of ante-
cedent preponderation in the will, it must be taken out before 
14. Edwards, WPE, II, 41. 
the will can be at liberty to determine itself the opposite 
way. In order for the will to be free, there must be perfect 
indifference or eQuilibrium. But, Edwards points out, the 
mind must have a preference in order for the will to make a 
choice. For where there is perfect indifference, there is 
no possibility of choice, for choice implies a preference. 
Thus, Edwards concludes, the view that says freedom donsists. 
in indifference is reduced to an ab~urdity. 
4. The Will and Necessity 
Edwards attacks the assumption that freedom exists only 
in that which is opposite, not only to constraint, but to · 
all necessity. It is impossible, according to Edwards, to 
conceive a volition which is contingent in such a sense, as 
not only to come to pass without any necessity of constraint 
or co-action, but also without a necessity of conseQuence or 
an infallible connection with any thing foregoing. 
For an event to have a cause and ground of its existence, 
and yet not to be connected with its cause is an impossi-
bility. :&'or if the event is not connected with the cause, it 
cannot be dependent on the cause. 
Edwards reasoned thus in order that he might demonstrate 
that every choice is necessarily the effect of a precon-
ditioning cause; and a cause which has determined the nature 
of that choice. If a man chooses, he chooses. necessarily--by 
the very nature of the case. To choose without a preference 
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is to Edwards no choice at all; but, on the other hand, to 
choose deliberately that which is preferred over something 
else is to make a choice that is a necessary one. There must 
always be a caase that is e~ual to the effect. 
Granting that this is: so, Edwards is convinced that such 
an argument refutes the Arminian notion that freedom is op-
posite to all necessity • 
. ···:~· 
5. Will and the Understanding 
Every act of the will is in some way connected with the 
understanding and can be further identified by being always 
as the greatest apparent good. Furthermore, Edwards says that 
nothing is more evident than that, when men act voluntarily, 
and do what. they please, they. do what appears, most agree-
able: to them. What makes the will choose' is something ap-
proved by the understanding, and conse~uently appearing to 
the mfund as good. Conversely, whatever the will refuses is 
something which appears to the mind as evil. Without excep-
tion, the will follows the last dictate of the understanding. 
Edwards says: 
The will is subject to the illumination, conviction, 
and notice of the understanding, with regard to the 
greatest goocl and evil proposed., reckoning both the de-
gree of good and evil understood, and the degree of 
understanding, notice, and conviction of that pro-
posed good and evil;- and that it is thus necessarily, 
and can be otherwise in no instance: because it is as-
serted, that it implies a contradiction to suppose it 
ever to be otherwise ••• So that the will does not deter-
mine itself in any one of its own acts; but all its acts, 
every act of choice and refusal depends on, and is neces-
sarily connected with some antecedent cause; which cause 
is not the will itself, nor any act of its own, nor any-
thing pertaining to that faculty, but something belong-
ing to another faculty, whose acts go before the will, in 
all its acts, and governs and determines them.l5 
Edwards asserts here that the will always follows the, 
last dictate of the understanding and is wholly subject to 
it. It is through the understanding ~hat man receives the 
moral incentive to do right. The understanding serves as the 
means whereby God is able to incite and provoke the will to 
volition. If God chooses to illuminate our understanding, 
then to do right becomes the strongest motive that is pre-
sented to the will, and the following choices are made accord-
ing to this motive. On the other hand, if God chooses to with-
draw his illumination from the understanding--which it is his 
perfect right to do--then man will still choose according to 
the strong'est motive but in this instance, the choice is more 
apt to be an evil one. Apart from the illumination of God, 
man finds that his highest good is to satisfy his own physical 
needs by any means that is available. 
It is. observed at once that Edwards's discussion of the 
faculty of understanding is essential to his entire system. 
It serves as a link to bring together some of the strands that 
otherwise seem disconnected. The understanding, according to 
Edwards, is that connection between God and man, which makes 
it possible for God to exett his sovereign will upon man. It 
is in the understanding where motives are formed, and motives 
15~ Edwards, V~E, II, 49-50. 
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in turn determine the will. 
When God chooses to illuminate the understanding, his 
presence is so effective that man necessarily makes righteous 
choices. God's grace is irresistible, to express the point in 
terms of one of John Calvin's famous five Phes-es. Other mo-
tives of lesser strength are temporarily submerged in the 
presence of God's illumination. However, the situation is dif-
ferent when God withdraws his illumination. Lesser motives, 
submerged by the presence of God, assume their former strength 
and once more determine the will in its choices. Even though 
man still chooses what he believes to be his greatest good, 
yet his mind being darkened by the absence of God's divine 
light, is under the power of selfish and evil motives. The 
ensuing choices betray this inner state of his soul. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
MORAL CONSIDERATIONS 
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l. Foreknowledge Inconsistent with Free Will 
Edwards believed in God's foreknowledge of all human 
events. He finds evidence, satiBfactory to his own thought, 
from Scripture and from the way in which God has dealt with 
the hi1.man race throughout history. Evidence of accurate future 
predictions is plentiful in the Old Testament and Edwards is 
much impressed by this fact. Outstanding among these predic~ 
tions is the messianic consciousness that is prevalent through-
out the Old Testament. In proof of this consciousness is the 
ultimate fulfillment of many prophetical insights in the life 
of J" esus Christ • 
Furthermore, Edwards notes that many historical events 
• were foretold, both by God, and men under the inspiration of 
God, which were consequent and dependent on the moral con-
duct of particular persons. Thus, unless one believes in God's 
foreknowledge of both his own acts and those of moral agents., 
Edwards concludes that one must accept a more difficult fact, 
namely, that the Scriptures possess many worthless specu-
lations. For Edwards, the choice was not a difficult one. To 
him, the Scriptures served as man's final authority for 
-· 
truth; and furthermore, they gave clear evidence of their own 
veracity. 
Relative to his concept of the will, Edwards thought it 
impossible that God could have foreknowledge in a system un-
controlled by necessity. In other words, free will is opposed 
to foreknowledge. Godts foreknowledge, according to Edwards, 
is based upon his foreordained decrees, rather than upon the 
nature of man, as the Arminians held. 
In criticism of the Arminian view, Edwards says: 
'That no future event can be certainly foreknown, whose 
existence is contingent, and without all necessity, may 
be proved thus; it is impossible for a thing to be cer-. 
tainly known to any intellect without evidence. To sup-
pose otherwise implies a contradiction; because, for a 
thing to be certainly known to any understanding, is the 
same thing as for that understanding to see evidence of 
it: but no understanding, created or uncreated, can see 
evidence where there is none: for that is the same thing 
as to see that to be which is not. And, hherefore, if 
there be any truth which is absolutely without ev~dence, 
that truth is absolutely unknowable, insomuch that it 
implies a contradiction to suppose that it is known.l 
Edwards defends the view that future events, unless 
brought about by necessity, are unable to be foreknown--even 
by the mind of God. The argument that God knows future events. 
on the basis of human nature, or upon any other basis--ex-
cept, of course, his' own foreordained decrees--is indeed a 
weak one. To attribute the power of foreknowledge to God was 
perfectly reasonable, according to Edwards; but to believe 
in foreknowledge and free will at the same time, as the 
1. Edwards, WPE, II, 74. 
Arminian theologians professed to do, appeared to Edwards as 
the gravest absurdity .. Determinism and foreknowledge were 
seen at once to be pa~tners. But.foreknowledge and free will 
represented two systems, diametrically opposed, and unsupport-
ed both by Scripture and reason. , 
That foreknowledge implied necessity was self-evident. 
To have a ground or reason for knowledge of future events 
was to Edwards the same as saying that there must exist a 
cause for those events. For how could there be evidence of a 
future event without the same evidence being, in some sense 
at least, a cause of that event? 
Edwards argues. also that tlforeknowl edge" of an event 
implies. necessity equally as much as rrafterknowledgen im-
plies necessity. Foreknowledge does not prove an event to be 
. more true or necessary than does afterknowledge. Conversely, 
· afterknowledge does not prove an event to be more true or 
necessary than dees. fo·reknowledge. Both types of knowledge 
demand that the event known be both true and necessary. The 
only difference that Edwards sees between the two is that no 
one questions the knowledge of a past event, simply because, 
the event is there to prove its own existence, whereas many 
question the necessity of future events. 
If an event is necessary by foreknowledge, then that 
event cannot be the effect of a fr .. ee.will that has deliber-
ated between two alternatives and finally made an arbitrrary 
choice. Rather, Edwards concluded, it must be the effect of 
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,certain causes, ordained by the foreknower, who knows that 
those causes will bring forth certain effects. On that basis 
God possesses foreknowledge of all human acts, and such fore-
knowledge is necessarily opposed to the Arminian view of free 
will. 
2. Command to Obedience Consistent with 
Moral Inability to Obey 
To the careful observer, there appears a marked incon-
sistency between the explicit commands of Scripture that call 
for obedience, truthfulness, goodness, and justice, and the 
fact that many to whom those words come have no power to 
obey such commands. However, Edwards affirms that no incon-
sistency exists, and fUrthermore, that God is justified in 
so dealing with moral agents. 
Edwards notes that the mind itself, and not only the. 
action which is the effect of the mind, is the proper object 
of precept or command. Furthe~more, the mind has no other 
faculty wliereby it can, in the most direct and proper sense, 
consent, yield toJ; or comply with any command, but the facul-
ty of the will. On the other hand, it is only through the 
will that the mind can disobey or refuse compliance with 
certain commands. 
But, it is observed, if the mind determines all the 
act of will, such as the Arminians affirm, it is therein 
subject to no command or moral government. Edwards says: 
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And thus the Arminian notion of the freedom of the will 
consisting in the soul's determining its own act of will 
instead of being essential to moral agency, and to men's' 
being the subjects of moral government, is utterly in-
consistent with it ••• So that mankind, according to this 
scheme, are subjects of command or moral government in 
nothing; and all their moral agency is entirely exclud-
ed and no room for virtue or vice in the world. So that 
it is the Arminian scheme, and not the scheme of the 
Calvinists, 2that is utterly inconsistent wLth moral government. 
Edwards says :further that there is no way to make Ar-
minian principles consist with moral government. For if one 
says that there iS· no prior dete·rmining act of the mind, pre-
ceding the acts of the will, but that volitions are events 
that come about by pure accident, without any determining 
cause, then: 
This is most palpable inconsistent with all use of laws; 
and precepts.; for nothing is more plain than that laws 
can be of' no use to direct and regulate perfect ac-
cident.J 
Proceeding to the defense of his own view, Edwards as-
serts that any opposition of the will to its original and 
determining act, or its failure to comply with it, implies. 
a moral inability to do that thing. Or, in other words, when-
ever a command reQuires a certain state or act of the will, 
and the person commanded, notwithstanding the command and 
the circumstances under which it is exhibited, still finds 
his will opposite to it, that man is morally unable to obey 
that command. The present inclination of the will is unable 
2. Edwards, WPE, II, 100. 
3. Ibid., 100. 
72 
to change itself, for the plain reason:that it is u~able to 
incline to change itself. Present choice cannot choose to do 
otherwise; for that would be to choose something diverse from 
what is at present chosen. 
If the will, all things now considered, inclines or 
chooses to go that way, then it cannot choose ••. to go 
the other way, and so cannot choose to be made to go 
the other way. To suppose the, mind is now truly in-
clined to change itself to a different inclination, is 
to suppose the mind is now truly inclined otherwise than 
it is now inclined. The will may oppose some remote 
future act that it is exposed to, but not its own pre-
sent act.4 
Thus, Edwards concludes, the will in every instance, 
acts by moral necessity and is morally unable to act other-
wise. A man is morally unable to choose contrary to a present 
inclination, ~ich in the least degree prevails; or contrary 
to that motive which has strength to move the will. 
Edwards's use of the term moral iS unusual, to say the 
least, and at this point invites further comment. A man is 
said to be morally unable to do a thing when he is under the 
influence or prevalence of a contrary inclination. According 
to Edwards, it is impossible to go against the present in-
clination or motive which is in the mind. Edwards says:: 
It is als,o evident, from what has been before proved, 
that the will is always, and in every individual act, 
necessarily determined by the strongest motive; and so 
is always unable to go against the motive, which ... has 
now t~e greatest strength and advantage to move the 
will •. 
The inability to go against. the strongest motive is what 
4. Edwards, ~~E, II, 101. 
5. Ibid., 101. 
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Edwards means by nmoral inability. n However, the question 
that arises out of this conclusion is whether or not moral, 
and moral inability, have any ethical and philosophical 
significance according to the way in which Edwards :n:a kes. use 
of those terms:. At best, it still appears that the moral con-
cepts of good and evil are much confused, and that "moral n 
itself is meaningless. 
Edwards asserts that the purpose of a command is to di-
rect the will into a certain line of choices. But, Edwards 
notes, if only that volition may be commanded to be which al-
ready is, there could be no use of precept; commands in all 
cases would be vain and impertinent. And not only may such 
a will be r~quired, as is wanting before the command is given, 
but also such as may possibly be wanting afterward--su·ch as 
the command may not be effectual to produce or excite. Other-
wise, Edwards says, no such thing as disobedience to a prop-
er and rightful command is possible in any case. 
By the foregoing reasoning, Edwards affirms, one must 
admit that anparticular command to obedience is not incon-
sistent with moral inability to obey. J!,or if one accepts· the 
view that no one is morally unable to obey a certain command, 
then one must admit also the possibility of no disobedience 
to a rightful and proper command. Edwards considered such a 
view to be much more unreasonable than his own. 
There are those who believe that moral inability ex-
cuses the disobedience which is implied in the opposition or 
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defect of inclination which remains after the command is given. 
Edwards replies that if such a view is. true, then wickedness 
always carries that in it which excuses it. It is ever true 
that the more wickedness there is in a man's heart, by so 
much the more is: his inclination to evil the stronger, and by 
so much the more, therefore, has. he of moral inability to the 
good required. Contrary to the view that moral inability ex-
cuses a man, Edwards says.: 
:mis moral inability, consisting in the strength of his 
evil inclinatign, is the very thing wherein his wicked-
ness consists. 
Against those who disagreed with Edwards on the basis of 
the distinction between a command and an invitation, Edwards 
defended himself again. In his mind, the two were very much 
the same. The point that those who disagreed with Edwards 
were making was that a great difference existed in the mind of 
the moral agent between a command to obedience and an invi-
tation to obedience. An invitation to obedience,. even with 
knowledge of the inability of. t'he moral agent to obey, would 
be consistent with the nature of God, whereas a command to 
obedience, under the same conditions, would be contrary to the 
nature of God. 
Edwards reply was thatcommands and invitations come 
from the same :source, and the ~ifference is only circum-
stantial. Commands are as much a manifestation of the will of 
6. Edwards, WPE, II, 103. 
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him that speaks, as invitations, and as much testimonies of 
expectations of compliance. 
The main difference between command and invitation con-
sists in the enforcement of the will of him who commands 
or invites. In the latter it is his kindness, the good-
ness which his will arises from: in the former it is 
his authority. But whatever be the ground of the will of 
him that speaks, or the enforcement of what he says, 
yet, seeing neither his will nor expectation is any 
more testified in the one case than the other; there-
fore a personts being known to be morally unable to do 
the thing to which he is directed by invitation, is no 
more an evidence of insincerity in him that directs in 
manifesting either a will, or expectation which he has 
not, than his being known to be morally unable to do 
what he is directed to by command.7 
3. Concerning the Necessity of Godts Will 
Edwards finds a personal delight and satisfaction in 
considering the necessity of God's will. To him, the neces-
saty determination of Godts will is a most reasonable con-
elusion. That some special privilege or dignity exists in 
God because he is without moral necessity is, to Edwards, an 
ungrounded assertion. It is no disadvantage or dishonor to 
God, to act necessarily in the most excellent and happy man-
ner, or to act according to the necessary perfection of his 
own nature. 
This argues no imperfection, inferiority or dependence, 
nor any want of dignity, privilege or ascendency. It is 
not inconsistent with the absolute and most perfect 
sovereignty of God. The sovereignty of God is, his abili-
ty and authority to do whatever pleases him; whereby 
nHe doth according to his will in the armies of Heaven, 
and among the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay 
7. Edwards, V~E, II, 1e5. 
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his hand or say unto him, what doest thou?" (Daniel 
4:35)8 
If the will of God is determined by infinite wisdom, then 
it is necessarily determined to that which is most wise. For, 
as Edwards observes, if the Divine Will were not necessarily 
determined to that which in every case is: wisest and best, it 
must be subject to S!ome degree of undesigning contingence, 
and so in the same degree l ia bl e to evil. Edwards says: 
If it be a disadvantage for the Divine Will to be at-
tended with this moral necessity, then the more free 
from it, and the more left at random, the greater dig-
nity and advantage. And, consequently, to be perfectly 
free from the direction of understanding, and uni-
versally and entirely left to senseless;, unmeaning con-
tingence, to act absolute at random, would be the su-
preme glory.9 
Edwards concludes that if it derogates nothing from the 
glory of Gat, to be necessarily determined by superior fit-
ness in some things, then neither does it to be thus deter-
mined in all things. 
4. God not the Author of Sin 
The chief objection against Edwards's system, urged by 
the Arminians, was that the doctrine of the necessity of 
. 
men's volitions, or their necessary connection with ante-
cedent events and circumstances, makes the first cause, and 
the supreme orderer of all things, the: author of sin. Ed-
wards's own words give rise to such an objection when he says 
"He has. so constituted the state and course of things, that 
8. Edwards, WPE, II, 144. 
9. Ibid., 145. 
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sinful volitions become necessary in consequence of his dis-
posal.1110 
However, Edwards defends his system by saying that God 
is as niuch the author of sin according to the Arminian view 
as by his own view. Furthermore, Edwards asserts that his 
view of God lends itself to clearer elucidation, and is more 
consistent with God's revelation of himself than is the Ar-
minian view. Edwards says: 
Again, if it will follow at all, that God is the author 
of sin, from what has bee·n supposed of a sure and in-
fallible connection between antecedents and consequents, 
it will follow becaus,e of this ••• that for God to be the 
author or orderer of those things which, he knows be-
forehand, will infallibly be attended with such a con-
sequence, is the same thing, in effect, as for him to 
be the author of that consequence,. But, if this be s.o, 
this is a difficulty which equally attends the doctrine 
of Arminians themselves; at least, of those of' them 
who allow God's certain foreknowledge of all events .ll 
Edwards makes a distinction between the nagent'' of a 
sinful deed and the rrpermitter" of a sinful deed. 
If by the author oil sin, be meant the sinner, the agent, 
or actor of sin, or the doer of a wicked thing; so it 
would be a reproach and. blasphemy, to suppose God to be 
the author of S;in. In this sense, I utterly deny God to 
be the author of sin •.• But if, . by the author of s:in, is 
meant the permitter, or not a hinderer of sin; and, at 
the same time, a disposer of the state of events, in 
such a manner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends 
and purposes, that s:inJ;~ if it be permitted or not hin-
dered, will most certainly and infallible follow: I say, 
if this be all that is meant, by being the author of sin, 
I do not deny that God is the author of sin ••• And, I do 
not deny, that God's being thus the author of sin, fol-
lows from what I have laid down; and, I assert, that it 
equally follows from the doctrines which are maintained 
10. Edwards, WPE, II, 155. 
ll. Ibid. , 156. 
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by most of the.· Arminian divines.l2 
Edwards uses several outstanding incidents in Scripture 
to confirm his point of view. The tragedy involving the death 
of Christ most certainly involved sin on the part of those 
who crucified him, yet no one denies that the event. was in the 
plan of God and that God over-ruled .the wills of those who 
committed the sinful acts "for excellent, holy, gracious 
and glorious ends.nl3 The Old Testament incident of Joseph 
being sold into Egypt was a wicked act in itself, yet God was 
working out his own futm:l!le plan :for the Israelites. By many 
more biblical incidents, Edwards gives support to his point 
of view. 
Man sins when he is left to himself--that is, when God 
sees :fit to withdraw his presence from him. However, this does 
not make God the author of sin. Sin originates from the nature 
of man's own heart, and he himself is the cause and authiDD of 
it. 
So, inasmuch as s.in is not the fruit of any positive. 
agency or influence of the most High, but, on the con-
trary, arises from the withholding of his action and 
energy, and, under certain circumstances, necessarily 
follows on the want of his, influence; this is no argu-
ment that he is; sinful, or his operation evil, or has 
· anything of the nature of evil, but, on the contrary, 
that he and his agency are altogether good and holy .•• 
It would be strange arguing, indeed, because men never 
commit sin, but only when God leaves them to them-
selves, and necessarily sin, when he does so, that there.-
fore their sin is not from themselves but from God; and 
so, that God must be a sinful Being; as strange as it 
12. Edwards, WPE, II, 157. 
13. Ibid., 159. 
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would be to argue, because it is always dark when the 
sun is gone, that therefore all darkness is from the 
sun, and that his disk and beams must needs be black.l4 
In answer to the argument that Edwards's view of God 
makes God will evil in order that good may come, Edwards re-
plies that when God permits evil uit is not to do evil that 
good may come; for it is. not to do evil at all. nl5 Edwards 
says that for a thing to be morally evil, it must be a thing 
unfit and unsuitable in its own nature, and it must proceed 
from an evil disposition, and be done for an evil end. But, 
Edwards asserts, neither of these characteristics applies to 
the ordering and permitting of such events as, God uses to 
fulfill his will and purpose. 
Edwards reasons that if a good man knew with absolute 
certainty that it would be best that there should be such a 
thing as moral evil in the world, it would not be contrary 
to his wisdom and goodness, for him to choose that it should 
be so. It is not an evil desire to desire good, and to de-
sire that which, all things considered, is best. On the con-
trary, it would be a plain defect in wisdom and goodness for 
him not to choose it. Applying the same reasoning to God, Ed-
wards concludes that the existence of moral evil in the world 
is simply the product of God's will, acting in accordance 
with what he considers to be the best and most wise. 
14. Edwards, WPE, II, 160. 
15. Ibid. , 16~ .• 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
A DETERMINISTIC SYSTEM 
l. Sovereignty of God's Will 
Edwards's philosophy and the;ology is. built around the 
sovereignty of God's will~ Proceeding from this foundation, 
Edwards built a system that was both rational and consis:tent. 
To grant him his thesis, is to grant him his vh ole system--
for it is observed that the roots of each particular doctrine 
can be traced to the original propos;i tion. 
In summing up the. significance of Edwards in American 
theology, Frederick Mayer in A History of American Thought 
lists as his primary contribution the philosophical defense 
of Calvinism nwhich demonstrated the consistency of the doc-
trines. of original sin, predestination, and God's sover-
eignty. rrl 
Although ln hia younger days, Edwards rebelled against 
the Calvinistic doctrines of the day, yet in describing his 
own religious experience, Edwards says, that it left him "fully 
satisfied as to this sovereignty o:f God" and. left him with a 
ndelightful conviction." 
1 .. Mayer, HAT, 38. 
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In a sermon on God's sovereignty, Edwards gives a system-
atic exposition of his own thought. He begins by defining the 
sovereignty of God as "His absolute, independent right of 
disposing of all creatures according to his own pleasure .•• 
The will of God. is called his mere pleasure .. t~2 
As to what God's sovereignty impl'ies, Edwards observes 
that God can bestow his goodness on those whom he pleases, 
and withdraw his goodness as he pleases--without experiencing 
any prejudice within himself. For, Edwards declares, all men 
by their very natures are necessarily under the wrath of God, 
and it is an expression of God's love that he sees fit to re-
veal himself even to a limited number. Apart from the death 
of Christ even this limited demonstration of God's love would 
have been impossible. 
It lies in the nature of God to express his attributes. 
Edwards says~: 
The glory of God eminently appears in his absolute 
sovereignty over all creatures, great and small. If the 
glory of a prince be his power and dominion, then the: 
glory of God is his absolute sovereignty. Herein appears 
God's infinite greatness and highness above all creatures 
Therefore it is the will of God to manifest his sover-
eignty. And his sovereignty, like his other attributes, 
is manifested in the exercise· of it.3 
God'S; sovereignty completely overshadows the will of 
man and his capacities. God is glorified. in man's dependence 
and for that reason God. made man, that God himself might reap 
2. Edwards, VVPE, IV, 549 .. 
3. Ibid., 557-. 
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hitherto unrealized benefits. 
Man's will is subject to the will of God, and! God can 
determine it according to his own pleasure. When God invades: 
man's consciousness, it is impossible for man to resist his 
presence. The irresistible grace of God, a term that Edwards 
borrows from Calvin, so affects the nature of man's mind that 
to do according to this grac.e: becomes the strongest motive. 
The will, always determined by the strongest motive, chooses 
accordingly. 
Edwards affirms that apart from Goa's sovereignty, all 
would be chaos in the world, and that order and design would 
be nonexistent. It is: God's sovereign will that supports the 
universe and gives to it its harmony and design. 
Divine sovereignty is not inconsistent, with human 
liberty, according to Edwards's definition of it. 
Therefore the sovereignty of God!. doubtless extends to 
this matter; es:pecially considering, that if it should 
be supposed to be otherwise, and God should leave men's 
volitions, and all moral events, to the determination 
and disposition of blind and unmeaning causes, or they 
should be left to happen perfectly without a cause; this 
would be no more consistent with liberty, in any notion 
of it, and particularly not in the Arminian notion of it, 
than if these events were subject to the dis:posal of 
Divine Providence, ·.andl the will or man were determined 
by circumstances which are ordered and disposed by Divine 
Wisdom ••.• But it is §vident, that such a providential dis-
peeing and determining men's moral actions., though it 
infers a moral necessity of those actions., yet it does 
not in the least infringe the real liberty of mankind; 
the only liberty that common sense teaches. to be neces-
sary to moral agency, which, as has been demonstrated, 
is not inconsistent with such necessity.4 
4. Edwards, WPE, II, 161. 
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In theory, Edwards's doctrine makes God appear cold and 
heartless. God is pictured as the eternal sovereign who de-
lights in exercis'ing his justice upon mankind. The mere mem-
ory o:f Edwards's sermon on "Sinners in the Hands of an angry 
Godn is enough to strike fear into anyone's soul. God elects 
whom he will and damns whom he will~&according to his good 
pleasure. Regard. for human rights and desires seems to be all 
but lacking. 
However, there is another side to Edwards's system, 
which when considered thoughtfully, helps to modify such a 
narrow view of God. In theory Edwards makes God transcendent; 
but in practice he makes Gocl immanent. God is not only a God 
of justice and punishment, but he is also a God who enters 
into the everyday experiences and tragedies of moral agents. 
The best illustration of this latter view of God is to be 
found among several of Edwards's sermons, preached at North-
ampton and Stockbridge. Noteworthy of these are: "The Most 
High a Prayer Hearing God.," ttGoCIL the Best Portion of the 
Christian, 11 nThe Peace which Christ gives his True Followers, 11 
and nThe Excellency of Chris:t.tt 
Edwards's own personal experiences often bear witness to 
a different view of God than his doctrinal conclusions would 
indicate. For instance, he wrote the following account after 
having been alone meditating in a deserted pasture. 
And as I was walking there:, and looking up on the· sky 
and clouds, there came into my mind so sweet a sense of 
the glorious majesty and grace of God, that I know not 
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how to ·express. I seemeQ. to see them both in a sweet 
conjunction; majesty and-meekness joined together; it 
was a sweet, and gentle, and holy majesty; and also a 
majestic meekness; an awful sweetness; a high, and great, 
and holy gentleness.5 
The God described in this g_uotation does not sound like, 
Edwards's s-overeign God, yet Edwards make a :place in his sys-
tem f'or both sides of' God.' s nature. At one time God is a 
sovereign God of justice; at another he is a God of' love and. 
mercy. 
Edwards's :personal conviction of' God's sovereignty is 
expressed in the following g_uotation: 
The doctrines of God's absolute sovereignty, and free 
grace, in showing mercy to whom-he would show mercy; 
and man's, absolute dependence. on the operations of God. 1 s 
Holy Spirit, have very often appeared to me as sweet 
and glorious doctrines. These doctrines have been much 
my delight. It ha~ often been my del~ght to approach 
God, and ask sovereign mercy of him. · 
The sacrifice of' moral freedom and a self-determining 
will--concepts which Edwards regarded as unreasonable accord-
ing to the Arminian definition--was but slight in order that 
he might :portray a sovereign God. To him, God's sovereignty 
was the key to his own nature as well as the key to his deal-
ings with the human race. 
2. Unconditional Determination 
Stemming directly from Edwards's doctrine of' a sovereign 
God, is the doctrine of' :predestination or unconditional de-
termination. Edwards, at this :point, is in essential 
5. Edwards, WPE, I, 20. 
6. Ibid. , 23 •. 
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agreement with the following words of John Calvin: 
Predestination we call the eternal decree of God, by 
which he has determined in himself, what he would have 
to become of every individual of mankind. For they are 
not all created with a. similar destiny; but eternal life 
is roreordained for some, and eternal damnation for 
others ••• In conformity .•• to the clear doctrine of the 
Scripture, we assert, that by an eternal and immutable 
counsel, God has once for all determined, both whom he 
would admit to salvation, and whom he would condemn to 
destruction.? -
To Edwards, the doctrine of predesLination was both a 
personal conviction and the product· of sound reason. To ac-
cept any other view meant a necessary alteration in his view 
of Godr,~ and consequently a reconstruction of his whole sys-
tem. 
In a statement about the divine decrees, Edwards! says:: 
The meaning of the word absolute, when used about the 
decrees, wants, to be stated ••• That God decrees all things. 
harmoniously, and in excellent order, one thing harmon-
izes with another, and there is such a relation between 
all the decrees, as makes the most excellent order.8 
Edwards considered it no injustice on the part of God 
that he determined the destiny of all moral agents--not on 
the basis of any merit or lack of merit in the agent, but 
wholly as the result of his own arbitrary will. 
On being accused·that such a doctrine corresponded. with 
the Stoics in their doctrine of fate, Edwards surprised his 
critics by speaking in defense of the Stoics, and by point-
ing out a marked similarity between Stoicism and Christianity. 
7. Calvin, ICR, III, xxi, 7. 
8. Edwards, WPE, II, 514. 
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Edwards says: 
The Stoic Philosophers, by the general agreement of 
Christians, and even by Arminian divines, were the great-
est, wisest, and most virtuous of all the heathennphi-
losophers; and, in their doctrine and practice, came the 
nearest' to Christianity of any of their sects. How fre-
quently' are the sayings of these philosophers., in many 
of th-e writings and sermons:, even of Arminian divines, 
produced, not as arguments of the falseness of the doc-
trines which they delivered, but as· confirmation of some 
of the greatest truths of the Christian religion, re-
lating to the unity and perfections of the Go€1head, a 
future state, the duty and happiness of mankind .• ·.as ob-
serving how the light of nature and reason, in the wis-
est and best of the heathen, harmonized with, and con-
firms the. Gospel of Jesus Christ. 9 
Edwards is to be commended for his defense of the Stoics,, 
Even in the face of his own supposed narrowness and dogmatism, 
Edwards was receptive to truth from an unexpected source. It 
reflects a true Tfliberaln attitude in Edwards that should not 
be overlooked, or at the same time misinterpreted. Edwards 
was a searcher for truth and no mere prejudice was sufficient 
to hinder him in his quest. 
Edwards says that it is because of the wisdom and good-
ness of God that all events come about fatally and necessarily 
This principle appli~s also to moral agents, and thus it is 
no injustice on the part of God that he determines who is 
certainly to sin and eventually to be damned. 
For if we suppose this impossibility, that God had not 
determined anything, things would happen as fatally as 
they do now. For, as to such an absolute contingency, 
which they attribute to man's will, calling it the sover-
eignty of the will; if they mean, by this sovereignty of 
will, that a man can will as he wills, it is perfect 
9. Edwards, ¥~E, II, 141. 
87 
nonsense, and the same as if they should spend abundance 
of time and pains, and be very hot at proving, that a 
man can will when he doth will; that it is possible for 
that to be which is. But if they mean, that there is a 
perfect contingency in the will of man, that is, that it 
happens merely by chance that a man wills such a thing, 
and not another, it is an impossibility and contradic-
tion, that a thing should be without any cause or reason, 
and when there was every way as much cause why it should 
not have been. Wherefore, seeing things do unavoidably 
go fatally and necessarily, what injustice is it in the 
Supreme Being, seeing it is a contradiction that it 
should be gtherwise, to decree that they should be as 
they are.l 
Edwards, in defending his doctrine: of predes.tination, 
answered as many objections as possible. Answers to certain 
objections are here noted: 
1. To what purpose are praying ·and striving, if all was 
irreversibly determined by God? Edwards. answers: 
The decrees of our everlasting state were not before 
our prayers and strivings; for these are as much present 
with God from all eternity, as they ·are the moment they 
are present with us. They are· present as part of his de-
crees ••• and they did as really exist in eternity, with 
respect to God., as they exist in t-4n.e, and as ~uch at 
one time as another.ll 
2. If God has decreed every action of men, then is it 
not so that God has decreed sinful acts? 
That God has decreed every action of men ••• and yet that 
God does not decree the actions that are sinful, as sin, 
but decrees them as good, is really consistent ••• But by 
decreeing an action as sinful, I mean decreeing it for 
the sake of the sinfulness of the action. God decrees 
that they shall be sinful for the sake of the good that 
he causes to arise from the sinfulness thereof; whereas 
man decrees• them for the sake of the evil that is in 
them.l2 
10. Edwards, WPE, II, 515. 
ll. Ibid., 515. 
12. Ibid., 515. 
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30 Is there a distinction between God's revealed will 
and his secret will, or his will of command and decree? 
His will in both senses is his inclination .•• But when 
we say he wills virtue .•• there·by is intended, that vir-
tue, or the creatures happiness, absolutely and simply 
considered, is agreeable to the inclination of his na-
ture. His will of decree, is his inclination to a thing, 
not as to that thing absolutely and simply, but with 
respect to the universality of things: ••• So God, though 
he hates a thing as it i~ simply, may incline to it ~th 
reference to the universality of things .•• God inclines 
to excellency, which is harmony, but yet may incline 
to suffer that which is unharmonious in itself, for the 
promotion of universal harmony ••• And thus it must needs 
be •.•. that we own these two wills of God.l3 
4. Since Goa decreed that there should be sin, what 
then is his purpose in letting it come to pass? 
Thus it is necessary, that God's awful majesty, his 
authority, and dreadful greatness, justice and holines.s, 
should be manifested. But this could not be unless sin 
and punishment had been decreed .•. There would be no 
manifestation of God's grace or true goodness, if there 
weBe no sin to be pardoned, no misery to be saved from.l4 
Edwards raises many other objections against his own 
view of predestination, but answers each in much the same 
manner as has been shown in the examples given. No one can 
deny that Edwards had a system that in itself was rationally 
consistent. To grant him his basic thesis is also to grant 
him his eventual conclusions. 
However, here lies the problem of his whole system, and 
in fact the central problem of any metaphysical system. What 
is the view·of God? Edwards's view of God, arising from the 
external influences. upon his early life, and from the 
13. Edwards, vVPE, II, 516. 
14. Edwards, WPE, II, 516. 
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experiences of his own soul, led him to the system that he 
devised. The doctrine of predestination, whereby man is un-
conditionally determined, was a logical conseQuence of that 
system. 
3. Man Held Responsible for all Acts 
The task of reconciling the justice of God in the dam-
nation of sinners with a system controlled by necessity and 
foreordained decrees was one that Edwards f-ound it necessary 
to perform. Anyone attempting to deal critically with his~ 
thought could scarcely avoid asking the question as to how 
there could be any basis fo+ virtue and vice, guilt and in-
nocence in a deterministic system wherein free choice was non-
existent. 
However, Edwards considered it possible to solve the 
supposed dilemma and to offer effective arguments in defense 
of his point of view. 
Edwards asserts that a fallacy exists in the reasoning 
which says that the virtuousness of an act consists not in 
the nature of the act itself, but rather in the cause of that 
act. Following from this erroneous: conclusion is the belief 
that no matter how good the act in itself may be, yet if the 
cause of that act did not spring from virtuous sources:, the 
act itself must be called wicked. Conversely, if an evil act 
is committed, but the causes·of that act are not evil in dis-
position, then no guilt or blame can be attached to it. 
Contrary to this line of reasoning, Edwards affirmed 
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that "The essence of the virtue: and vice of dispositions of 
the heart and acts of the will, lies not in their cause, but 
their nature. nl5 
Ingratitude is hateful and deserving of dispraise--not 
becau:se something of a bad nature in the heart produced in-
gratitude--but because it is unpleasant by its very nature. 
On the other hand, Edwards reasons, the love of virtue is 
worthy of praise--not because there is a virtuous disposition 
in the heart--but because the love of virtue in itself is a 
good thing. True, an evil disposition of heart is apt to pro-
duce evil acts.; and a good Cl;isposition of heart good acts; 
but still the act in itself is the only reasonable basis on 
which to judge its goodness or badne~s. 
Applying this conclusion to his total system, Edwards: 
reasoned that God judges the moral acts of ~anki~d on the 
basis of the nature of the acts themselves, rather than on 
the basis: of the cause which produced them. Even thrugh it 
is ultimately God who has been responsible for the sinful 
deeds of mankind, yet man is the occasional cause of them, 
and must accept due responsibility. 
Comment should be made at this point concerning some 
implications of Edwards's view on virtue and vice. In the 
first place, his insistence that the virtuousness of an act 
depends not upon the intent or purpose but the nature of the 
15. Edwards, WPE, II, 119. 
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act itself, is contrary to most ethical theory. Scripture 
itself, upon wh:Lch Edwards leaned heavily for many of his doc-
trines, states that a man is judged on the basis of the nin-
tentn or rtmotive" of an act rather than on the nature of the 
act. The Scripture says:: ''For as he thinketh in his heart, so 
is he" (Prov. 23:7). uKeep thy heart with all diligence; for 
out of it flow the issues of life" (Prov. 4: 23). rrFor the 
Lord seeth not as man seeth; for man looketh on the outward 
appearance, but the Lord looketh on the heart" (1 Sam. 16:7). 
Furthermore, Edwards's: position is; to be criticized in 
that it goes: against the natural concept of' good and evil. 
Suppose a man were good in every way, but through no fault of 
his, own he errs. According to Edwards, he is guilty and worthy 
of punishment--a bad man. On the other hand, if an evil man 
does a good act--good at least from the human or natural 
standpoint--he is to be judged as a good man rather than as 
the evil man he really is. According to this use of the 
terms good and e:Vil their real meanings: are hopelessly con-
fused. 1tMoraln as an ethical concept is deprived of any phil-
osophical significance. 
This doctrine is elaborated to some~ degree: in one of 
Edwards's sermons: 11The: Justice of God in the Damnation of 
Sinners;." Edwards develops the sermon around the statement 
nThe truth of' this doctrine may appear by the joint consider-
ation of two things: ••• man's sinfulness, and God's: 
92 
sovereignty. nl6 
In consideration of' man's sinfulness, Edwards asserts 
that sin against God, being a violation o:f infinite obli-
gations, must be a crime infinitely heinous, and so deserv-
ing of infinite punishment. Man, upon committing an act of sin 
becomes subject to God's punishment. Furthermore, all men 
are sinful to some degree and on that basis, God would be 
justified in permitting the whole human race to be eternally 
damned. On the other hand, it lies in the power of God to re-
deem whom he pleases, even the whole of mankind. Edwards says: 
It is meet that God should order all these things ac-
cording to his pleasure. By reason of his greatness and 
glory, by which he is infinitely above all, he is wor-
thy to be s.overeign, and that his pleasure should in all 
things take place: he is. worthy that he should make him-
self his end, and that he should make nothing but his 
own wisdom his rule in pnrsuing that end, without ask-
ing leave or counsel of any, and without giving any ac-
count of any of his mattersi. It is fit that he that is 
absolutely perfect, and infinitely wise, and the foun-
tain of all wisdom, should determine everything by his 
own will, even things of the greatest importance, such 
as the eternal salvation or damnation of sinners:.l7 
As a consequence of God's sovereignty, Edwards is, con-
vinced that God is. under no obligation to keep men from sin-
ning. However, man himself must assume responsibility for his 
own sin. Even though God decreed that there should be sin, in 
order that his mercy and love might be revealed in the sal-
vation of certain ones., yet man as the occasional cause of' 
sin takes upon himself the entire blame and guilt. 
17. Edwards, WPE, IV, 232. 
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CONCLUSION 
Any attempt to reduce the philosophy and theology of 
.Jonathan Edwards to a S;imple formula is more than likely to 
fail. His thought went beyond the narrow confines of any one 
particular dogma or controversial issue and expressed con-
cern for the greater and all-inclusive problems of mankind. 
It is obvious that much of Edwards's thought is expressed in 
theological language, and many on this account discredit the 
value that it may have as a philosophical contribution to the 
world. However, it is also obvious that much of Edwards's 
thought has in it deeper meanings and interpretations than 
any mere surface reading would indicate. 
At least one of the reasons why Edwards remains in con-
temporary consideration is the fact that so few are agreed 
as to what is the real contribution of his thought to phi~ 
losophy. Seen as a dogmatic Calvinist and a prophet of the 
·imminent wrath and judgment of God, Edwards is held by many 
to be a failure as a philosopher. Oliver Wendall Holmes., 
speaking as one of these critics, says: nEd.wards's sy8tem •.• 
seems in the light of today, to the last degree barbaric, 
mechanical, materialistic, pessimistic. rrl See'n from certain 
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angle·s, Edwards's system. warrants such a criticism. 
On the other hand, there· exists side by side with Ed-
wards's annunciations of coming judgments, a thoughtful analy-
sis or human nature and its social implications. Perry Mil-
ler sees in the system of Edwards, and particularly in The 
Freedom of the Will "an immense cipher. n A cipher has a dou-
ble meaning, one clear, and one in which the meaning is hid-
den. Such a description applies to Edwards's system. 
The Freedom of the Will, the most philosophical of Ed-
wards's writings, is not only a subtle polemic against Ar-
minian thought, and a defense of Calvinistic theology, but 
it is a record of prevailing social currents that were in 
existence in America at that time:. 
Perry Miller says: 
The Freedom of the Will is an arraignment of all par-
tial and halfhearted forms. of consent, of cheap aub-
stitutes, of false shows of benevolence. Read as a ci-
pher, as all Edwards's writings must be, it is a pene·-
trating analysis of modern culture, and specifically 
of the American variant. Which is to say that the writ-
ing of it posed for Edwards still more urgently the pro-
blem that the Awak~ning· first thrust upon him, the pro-
blem of history, and most importunately, the problem of 
America's role in the sequence of things throughout time, 
which is what men call history.2 
Miller sees in Edwards not only a man of piety and one 
who was concerned for a rational theology, but one als.o who 
was sensitive to the needs of society and tried to direct its 
course into the right channels of activity. Miller is also 
2. Miller, JE, 263. 
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convinced3 that our age is better prepared to comprehend Ed-
wards than was his own. For today, we have the benefit of 
observing our society as a part of it, and of seeing the evils 
which are so prevalent; whereas in the time of Edwards people· 
were not plagued with the same evils, or at least to the'same 
degree, and thus were unable to understand the fears which 
Edwards had as a result of his recognition of harmful social 
trends. 
Howeve·r, Edwards is to be criticized for considering Ar-
minian theology as the cause of the evils. True, Arminianism 
was exerting an· ever. widening influence upon .American thought, 
and on that basis Edwards's reasoning can be understood. But 
a more careful inquiry seems to indicate that rather than be-
ing a result of Arminian theology, the growing social evils 
were a reaction away from the earlier Puritanism with its ri-
gid social stan~ards. 
Turning particularly to the problem of this thesis, it 
should be noted that only a small portion of Edwards 1 s 
thought has come under consideration. True, as was stated in 
the Introduction, Edwards's view on freedom and determinism 
colored all his philosophical ideas, but one should not judge 
the man and his thought wholly on the basis of these con-
elusions. 
A knowledge of at least six basic premises is essential 
3. Miller, J"E, 260 • 
., 
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to an understanding of Edwards's thought on freedom and de-
terminism. l. The will of God is sovereign. 2. All men are 
sinful by nature. 3. Every effect must have a cause equal to 
that effect. 4. Indeterminism undermines the foundation of 
religion. 5. The: mind is unitary and functional. 6. The 
strongest motive always determines the will. 
Out of these six premises, Edwards constructed a system 
that was both rational and consistent. He is to be given 
credit for working out each premise to its logical conclusion, 
and as a consequence, every part fits together into a unified 
whole. 
However, certain criticism of Edwards's premises should 
be offered. If his premises are faulty, it follows that his 
conclusions will be faulty also. 
Edward:s' s: first premise, that the will of God is sover-
eign, raises questions which are vital to his whole ethical 
system. It should be pointed out that when Edwards uses the 
word 11 sovereignn, in reference to the will of God, it implies, 
God's eternal decrees, the determination of man's will, and 
the denial of moral freedom. The fundamental question is 
whether or not ethics, as a philosophical concept, has any 
meaning in a system founded on such a view of the sovereignty 
of God. To this question Edwards answers nyesn, although he 
encounters difficulty in giving a rational explanation for 
his view. To postulate a deterministic system presupposes 
the absence of ethics and moral responsibility and any attempt 
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to reconcile the two is due to failure. Edwards's attempt was. 
no exception, for it is evident throughout The Freedom of the 
Will that he failed to preser:fe at the same time the true 
meaning of both sovereignty and freedom. By preserving God's 
sovereignty--a must for Edwards--he sacrificed the real mean-
ing of freedom and ethics itself. 
Both the· reasonablene-ss and the ethical implications of 
,. 
Edwards's second premise can be called into Question. Ed-
ward~'s view that all men are sinful by nature calls for seri-
ous. scrutiny on the part of those who would agree 'with his 
premise. Although ori~inal sin ia an essential ~oncept to 
contemporary trNew Theologyn, yet most theologians and moral 
philosophers of today deny the traditional ylew of original 
sin. H. D. Lewis in Morals and the New Theology expresses 
well the view of this latter group. He says: 
A sinfulness which is as much that of the race as of the 
individual, which depends on a freedom QUite different. · 
from the power to choose between good and ill ••• is de-
void of relevance to the conduct of individual lives; 
and for that reaso~ alone it must stand discredited at 
the bar of ethics.4 
However, something can be said in defense of-Edwards, 
and of those.who hold to original sin, on the grounds of 
certain inherent peculi1;1rities and weaknesses in human nature 
itself. The real mistake lies in terming as sinful what, in 
the last analysis, is only a description of man as he is by 
nature. To hold man responsible for what he is by nature--as 
4. Lewis, MNT, 68. 
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did Edwards--is to act contrary to all ethical concepts or 
justice and morality. 
The third premise, that every errect must have a cause 
equal to that erfect, calls for comment. Although Edwards 
cannot be criticized too severely for his acceptance of the 
bare premise, yet he can be criticized on the basis of what 
he considers to be particular ncausesn and particular ner-
fects." When Edwards says.5 that a cause signiries any ante-
cedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on 
which an event depends, he makes 11 causen so broad in its mean 
ing and scope that it could well include all reality. In one 
sense at least, all reality becomes the cause of any par-
ticular event; and thus no definite cause can be ascribed to 
any event. Furthermore, Edwards says6 that he uses the word 
erfect for the consequence of what is more an occasion than 
a cause. 
The purpose or Edwards's use or-the words cause and ef-
feet is readily seen by noting his argument against the idea 
of a self-determining will, and by his assertion or God's 
s.overeignty. God is the cause of everything, even or a par-
ticular act or volition, although man feels that he himself 
is the cause or it. For Edwards, God is the nantecedentn to 
all events and thus is the only real and underlying cause of 
5. Edwards, WPE, II, 26. 
6 • Ibid. , 26 • 
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everything. 
Such a use of the cause and effect ~rgument cannot be 
justified in Edwards. According to his use of the term cause, 
he deprives it of any determining force; and his ·use of the 
term effect is contrary to sound reason. 
Premise four, that indeterminism undermines the foun-
dation of religion, invites certain criticisms. Edwards de-
fended this position on the grounds that freedom and free 
will engendered license and corruption rather than holiness 
and piety. Indeterminism leads men to justify their own ac~i 
tions,7 and diminishes the guilt of sin. When followed to its 
final consequences, indeterminism "leaves room for no such 
thing, as either virtue or vice, blame or praise in the 
world. n8 Edwards argues further that indeterminism encourages 
men to delay efforts toward the work of religion and virtue, 
and leads generally to unbelief. 
Edwards is to be criticized on this point because of the 
unempirical nature of his charges against indeterminism, and 
in effect, Arminianism. All available evidence points to the 
fact that the same so-called evil tendencies that Edwards 
found within Arminians were just as much in evidence within 
his own camp--the Calvinists. Yet Edwards seemed blind to 
this fact. 
Although Edwards would gladly blame the evils in both 
7. Edwards, WPE, II, 170. 
8. Ibid., 170. 
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groups upon Arminian theology, the facts do not warrant such 
a conclusion. The premise which Edwards defended was con-
sistent with the rest of his system, but he has not present-
ed sufficient evidence to convince others of its reason-
ableness. 
The fifth premise, that the mind is unitary and function-
al, comes under immediate criticism from certain psycho-
logical points of view, although it should be pointed out 
that Edwards's position was an improvement over the faculty-
psychology, and associationist psychology. Ho~ever, Edwards 
did not have the advantage of more recent psychological stud-
ies, and can be excused on that basis for some of his con-
elusions which are psychologically untenable. For instance, 
his assertion that the affections are not dependent upon any 
py:ysical stimulus, nthat an unbodied spirit may be as capable 
of love and hatred, joy or sorrow, hope or fear, or other af-
fections, as one that is united to a body"9 needs certain 
revisions. 
It is: q_uestionable whether or not Edwards's assertion 
that na man never wills anything contrary to his desires or 
desires anything contrary to his will nlO can stand the test 
of pmamnical experience. Many everyday incidents of life lead 
to a contrary conclusion. 
However, it must be said again that Edwards's premise'> 
9. Edwards, V~E, III, 4. 
10. Edwards, WPE, II, 2. 
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that the mind is unitary and functional, is consistent with 
his system and is made to perform a major function. For it 
is through the mind that God determines man's actions. God 
makes himself a part of man's motives, and motives in turn 
determine the will. 
This leads to the sixth premise, that the strongest mo-
tive always determines the will. According to Edwards's 
definition of motive as 11 the whole of that which moves, ex-
cites, or invites the mind to volitionnll his premise cannot 
be easily refuted. For certainly the mind, in the last anal-
ysis, always chooses according to whatever happens to be the 
strongest motive, whether that be something external or in-
ternal. But the real question is whether or not the will must 
choose according to the strongest motive. I:f not, then Ed-
wards can be granted his premise. But if the contrary is true, 
which certain experiences would seem to indicate, then the 
premise must be called into question. If the will is free, 
in the sense of self-determination, then if the· mind so 
chooses, the will must be free to go against the strongest 
motive. 
Other of Edwards's basic conclusions lend themselves to 
severe criticism. For instance, Edwards; does not give ade-
quate explanation as to how man is responsible for his moral 
actions in a deterministic system. Since man is not free, it 
ll • Edwards , WPE, II, 4. 
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poses a problem to reconcile this fact with man's responsi-
bility. 
Furthermore, Edwards's use of the word ttmoral'' raises 
a question as to the possibility of moral action in a uni-
verse controlled by necessity. Edwards's insistence that the 
virtue. of an act consists not in the intent or motive, but 
the nature of the act itself, l2 has. serious implications for 
the whole concept of morality. Such a view leaves the meaning 
of good and evil hopelessly confused and the traditional con-
cepts of ethics and morality without philosophical signifi-
canoe. 
Although leaning heavily upon Scripture to supuort 
certain of his views, yet Edwards makes a farce out of Scrip-
ture when he attempts to reconcile its explicit commands to 
obedience with the moral inability of man to obey such com-
mands. The clear invitation of Scripture for all men to ac-
cept the benefits of salvation is inconsistent with the eter-
nal decrees of God which make it impossible for certain ones 
to ~ccept that invitation. 
Edwards's definition of freedom leaves much to be de-
sired. Freedom as nthe man choosing'' sounds genuine, but this 
kind of freedom is no more real than the freedom a robot has 
in responding to certain electrical impulses. True, man makes 
the choice, and thus appears to be free, at least from an 
12. Edwards, \~E, II, 119. 
·•··· ·. 
103 
e 
external point o:f view. But in reality, man's inclinations, 
and motives, which ultimately determine his choices, are not 
subject to his control; rather, they are subject to the sove-
reign will o:f God. Freedom, according to this definition, has 
no moral signi:ficance. 
But in spite of the basic weaknesses wlilich beset his 
system, Edwards occupies a uni~ue place in the history o:f 
American thought. In the minds of those who learn to appreci-
ate the depth of his soul, the breadth of his vision, and the 
astuteness of his intellect, he stands a permanent symbol of 
spiritual strength and vitality. Only time it self will be 
able to reveal the total significance o:f Jonathan Edwards, 
a sincere seeker for truth. 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of' this: paper is to point out the contri-
bution of Jonathan.Edwards to thought about the problem of' 
f'reedom and determinism. This goal is pursued by an analysis 
of' the early inf'luences that were vital to the shaping of his 
thought, and by an attempt to give an accurate interpretation 
of his own doctrines. The source most used in the development 
of' those doctrines has been Edwards's own work The Freedom of 
the Will. Other of Edwards's: writings together with various: 
secondary sources make up the remainder of' works used. 
Edwards was both a philosopher and a theologian. As a 
philosopher he aimed t·o combine rationalism with mysticism; 
as a theologian he was Calvinistic. In his metaphysical doc-
trines the problem of being was: uppermost, and he held the 
view that idealism was a deeper philosophy than naturalism. 
In his moral theory, Edwards asserted the sovereignty 
of' God at the cost of man's free moral agency. At the same~ 
time, however, he held to human responsibility and sought to 
reconcile it with the eternal decrees of God. It is this di-
lemma in the thought of Edwards that has provided the inspir-
ation for this thesis, and an attempt to solve this apparent. 
contradiction makes up the main portion of its content. 
10 
Chapter two points out the signif'icance of' Edwardsts 
psychological analysis of' the human mind to his theory of' 
the will. The unitary and f'unctional nature of' the mind is 
the most important psychological concept that he discusses, 
although memory, consciousness, and personal identity re-
ceive some consideration. Edwards asserts that although the 
mind is made up of' several f'acul ties, yet it functions as a 
whole, never in separate parts. The will, the affections, and 
the understanding are interdependent and any inf'luence upon 
one has a corresponding inf'luence upon all the others. 
Chapter three is a consideration o:r Edwards's theory of' 
knowledge. Edwards holds that all our perceptions are com-
municated to us immediately by God. God is a nDivine and 
Supernatural Light 11 who reveals himself and his truth to the 
understanding of man. Truth is the agreement of' our ideas 
with existence--and God and real existence are the same. 
Reason in man is the subject of' GoQ's illumination, but 
reason in itself is not a substitute f'or revelation. Through 
the f'unction of intuition the mind has an immediate awareness 
of' spiritual truths, and comprehends aesthetic perf'ection. 
In chapter four is stated Edwards's view of' freedom. 
Freedom is defined as nthe man choosingn but this def'inition 
accounts in no way for how that choice came to be--whether 
it came about as a consequence o:r some power in the man's 
own will, or whether it was caused by f'orces other than his 
will. Edwards denies that freedom consists in any power of' 
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self-determination and asserts that such·a view leads eventu-
ally to an unresolvable ambiguity. 
Included in this chapter also is a brier statement or 
Edwards's meaning or philosophical, natural, and moral ne-
cessity. 
The main discussion or the will is round in chapter 
rive. Here Edwards points out several fundamental principles 
concerning the will and its relation to freedom and determin-
ism. 1. The strongest motive ultimately determines the will 
in all its choices. 2. Negative factors can control the will 
equally as much as positive factors, e.g., the absence or 
God's illumination makes it necessary ror man to choose evil 
instead of good. 3. Freedom does not consist in indifference, 
ror where there is perfect indifference there is no pos-
sibility or choice. 4. The will is subject to the understand-
ing, ror it is in the understanding where motives originate, 
and motives in turn determine the will. 
In chapter six, various. moral considerations, arising 
as necessary consequents or Edwards's system, are given limit-
ed discussion. Among these considerations are the following: 
God's foreknowledge, Edwards's belief in the consistency or 
certain commands to obedience with the moral inability to 
obey, the necessary determination or God's will, and Ed-
wards's view that God is not the author or sin. 
The conclusions of this chapter, perhaps more than those 
or any other, point out the influence or Calvinistic theology 
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upon the thought of Edwards. 
Chapter seven considers the effect of Edwards's belief 
in the sovereignty of God upon his thought about freedom and 
determinism. To Edwards, the sovereignty of God was both a 
rational belief and a personal conviction. It can be said 
with good reason that Edwards's belief in God's sovereignty 
was the key to all his thought, both in philosophy and the-
ology. 
As a consequence of God's sovereign will, the will of 
man is unconditionally determined in all its moral acts. Al-
though such a view makes God appear unjust from the human 
point of view, yet from God's point of view he is acting ac-
cording to that within his nature which is most wise and 
benevolent. 
Also discussed in this chapter is Edwards's belief that 
man must accept the responsibility of his moral acts. Al-
though defending it on insufficient grounds, Edwards found 
it necessary to hold such a view in order to be consistent 
with his other conclusions. 
The conclusion of this thesis points out the basic pre-
mises from which Edwards developed his thought about freedom 
and determinism. 
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